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ROUGH WAR TO PEACE

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THROUGH WAR TO PEACE

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THROUGH WAR TO PEACE

BY

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INTRODUCTION

THERE is a growing sentiment in this country that what Germany has come to stand for is utterly irreconcilable with all those acquisitions of human society — freedom, democracy, humanity, Christianity — which we most prize; that it represents a grave menace to them all. This sentiment, with its attendant foreboding, I believe to be substantially correct, so that it will bear examination in the light of reason and science. I think it can be shown that the German code of international behavior constitutes a direct and grave challenge to the essentials of civilization; that it is a reversion toward an earlier and cruder phase of societal development; and that it must be extirpated if civilization is to go forward on its normal course.

If reason is to be found back of this popular presentiment, that fact will confer a certain solidity and surety upon what we might otherwise, in the face of specious argument or unpleasant consequences, cleave to less tenaciously. It will lead to the strengthening of hearts. But strong

hearts are what we require in these times; for the world is tiring under the burden of its loss and misery, and even the sturdiest has need of holding his convictions fast. There is also an indeterminate number who are less firm in the faith, and who are likely to falter unless they are fortified by an abiding belief that this challenge to civilization must and can be met and repelled, if we faint not. They need to be shown that relentlessness in the exaction of "restitution, reparation, and guarantees" is not an expression of rage and revengefulness, but rather of the highest form of humanity — of interest in the welfare of all men, to be secured, in this case, by relieving the race of the German peril. It is "Through War to Peace," and not otherwise. A faith has never been weakened by the demonstration that it had reason behind it.

Some of us are further convinced that this peril is certain to be eliminated, now or later, by the operation of the elemental forces which have made civilization what it is. Here is a cause that cannot fail. But we want it to triumph now rather than later. For it is at the cost of much human agony that the operation of these elemental forces is hindered and retarded, through a failure to understand and work with them;

and their action may be hastened, with the result of sparing human suffering, if we seek to understand and fall in with their massive stress and do not, for the sake of petty sentiment, throw ourselves, as chosen victims, across their path. This issue is going to be settled aright despite human foolishness — despite even an easy-going and irrelevant "magnanimity"; and if we can see that now, and not try to stop the process short of a definitive decision, we shall save ourselves and those that come after us an infinity of suffering.

A rational justification for such convictions appears, I think, in the following pages. Events even so startling as those of the present fall into line as episodes of society's development, if the course of that development is seen in perspective — in the light, that is, of a general survey of societal evolution, made with no special reference to any one of its episodes as compared with the rest. But it is impossible to present this war in such a perspective without devoting some pages to an indication of the line of approach here adopted, and without using a minimum of terminology. This clearing of the ground will doubtless slow up the pace of presentation appreciably, but it has to be done if the conclusions in the last few chapters — to which the reader

who is impatient of the approach may refer — are to carry more weight than they would as mere expressions of personal opinion.

Whatever enlightenment this essay has to offer is due to the fact that societies are here viewed as wholes and not in terms of their ultimate components, namely, individuals. Much is said of the dominance in societal evolution of the automatic, spontaneous, and impersonal, as against the individual and purposeful. It is in part for the sake of emphasizing this point of approach that I use the adjective "societal," meaning "of society," instead of "social," which has no precise meaning. It is my belief that the great mass of individuals pursue their petty interests as they see them, close at hand, in virtual unconsciousness of the wide interests of the society, while the society moves ponderously on, under laws of its own, through a succession of phases which the individual has to accept, much as he accepts climate or rainfall, as conditions of life. The occasional endowed individual identifies the impersonal forces in the field and seems to control them, much as does the engineer, by moving things into or out of their way; but the vast bulk of mankind live on unconscious of their very existence, or vaguely sensing it.

There is a confused view of society that may be gotten by preoccupation with the individual, his psychology and his "choices"; then there is another, which seems to some of us to offer superior clarity, that takes account of the individual as the ultimate component of society and then sets him aside. The latter view is the one taken here. It is not so obvious as the other and demands emphasis; but any one who has caught it once will not be much disturbed by the absence of fine balancings and whittlings in the pages that are to follow.

Rightly or wrongly, I find myself in no great doubt or anxiety as to the ultimate outcome of this international conflict. My conclusions, as worked out for my own satisfaction, are something of a comfort to me; and I hope they may be of use to others, in particular to those who, just because they are enviably able to lend the strength of their arms to the cause of civilization and human freedom, have the less leisure to reflect over the wider aspects of the conflict.

A. G. K.

New Haven, December 27, 1917.

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THROUGH WAR TO PEACE

I. THE IMPERSONAL CHARACTER OF THE ISSUE

To all of us most of the time, and to most of us all of the time, the course of this war has been a succession of particular events and of the doings of particular persons. The head-lines are scanned to see whether the battle-lines have changed, whether this or that wavering neutral has thrown its lot into the struggle, whether the prospects of the Loan have improved, and so on. Even more typical of our attitude is the interest in persons. What has been said overnight by Lloyd George, the German Chancellor, Trotzky, President Wilson, Colonel Roosevelt? Has Edison discovered anything? Has Hoover any new project? Are there any more revelations from the Department of State concerning German diplomacy? Or — a matter of still more intimate personal interest — is the acquaintance,

friend, brother, or son about to be called? Is the reader of the day's news himself to be drafted?

We cannot help being interested in these immediate things. That is the way we live — amidst the definite and immediate; and then we think with less strain if we think in terms of persons. In fact, the race has always personalized the less tangible and more abstract things, for by such means it has been possible to tie up floating and evasive conceptions so that they can be found again and dealt with. The vast impersonalities that control our destiny — Nature, Chance, God — are rendered into terms that men are more used to handle. It is as if one should meet some difficult proposition, full of subtleties of thought, in a partially known foreign language; he will feel more secure if he gets it across into the mother-tongue before he tries to do much with it. The de-personalization of what has been long personalized has demanded a tedious process of mental discipline and development. "It is difficult," writes Darwin, "to avoid personifying the word Nature"; and he warns against the superficial interpretation that is commonly put upon the term by the reader, although the author is employing it, for brevity's

sake, to cover "the aggregate action and product of many natural laws."

But absorption with the immediate and personal, though natural enough, does not make for comprehensiveness of view. It prevents us from seeing the woods for the trees. To see the woods, it is necessary to secure distance and detachment. Yet a view of the woods is sometimes most desirable, especially if one is confused by the number and apparently unmeaning location of the trees. To see the forest it is necessary to get outside of it, whether that be done by somehow ascending above it, or by having recourse to the mind's eye and viewing the broad lay of the land from the mapped-out results of the experience of others.

I suppose that no one will quarrel very much over the aptness of this analogy to the present facts. In the matter of this war-situation we are wandering in the woods, and most of us are concerned as to where we are and how and at what place we are going to get out. But the analogy is employed merely by way of setting the situation before us; it is not conceived to carry any weight of argument.

In viewing the course of the war, then, attention has been much focussed upon persons —

personages, perhaps, might be the better term. But this tendency goes farther. Human groups, such as the Bolsheviki, the War Council, the pacifists, and even larger groups or societies, as the Belgians, Jugo-Slavs, Entente Allies, or Neutrals, are seen as a combination of the individuals that compose them rather than in their impersonal corporate form. In fact, we are prone to think of any human society, or of Society in general, in terms of its components rather than as an entity in and of itself. We also tend to personify Society as we do Nature, and do not ordinarily think of it (to adapt Darwin's words) as the aggregate action and product of many societal laws.

This conception of human society as a sort of composite of individuals, having no special being of its own, is an easy and obvious one; and it has been elaborated by theorists. These hold, briefly stated, that to understand society the object of interest and study is the individual; and that, since the mind of the latter is the part of him that attends to his social relations and interactions, the prime object in the study of society is to become clear on individual psychology. Study the human intellect and you are on the way to an understanding of the "social

mind," which directs society's destiny. Then presently you issue into "social psychology" or "psychological sociology," and the keys to the whole matter are delivered into your hands. Social development, we are told, is the result of the reasoned and purposeful action of the individual. An extreme of this view would, with Carlyle, see the history of a nation in the biography of its heroic figures. A social philosophy of this order is a popular one, for it lends learned support to that current prejudice toward interest in the personal and immediate (which we think we know without so much study, living in it as we do) to which allusion was made at the outset.

It is the object of the present writing, however, to present that vast episode in societal evolution (meaning the evolution of human society), which is working itself out before our eyes, from an altogether different point of view — one which recognizes the individual as a component part of society, and then ignores him, much as the physiologist recognizes the cell as the undoubted final component of the body, but then ignores it in favor of a study of the body as a whole. The body is an object of study by itself, and results are gotten from physiology that could not be attained by restricting attention to the cell. I

do not intend, though, to enter into a technical controversy, but rather to cite, first, a series of societal changes belonging to the war-period, and for whose appearance the reasoned purposefulness of the individual does not seem responsible; and then to present the advantages of what is to me a more commanding point of view for the observation and understanding of the societal formations and dissolutions that are taking place as the days go by.

II. UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES TO SOCIETY

Societal changes of great moment have taken place, not only in Europe, but in the rest of the world as well, since the war began. I do not refer so much to the almost complete national destruction of Belgium or Serbia, under the iron heel itself, as to the less direct consequences of the strife. I take examples almost at random, as they suggest themselves. In England there has come to pass a centralization of government, together with a decline of parliamentary control, that must startle the elderly Briton who contemplates it. Again, the women are doing men's work, are beginning, in large numbers, to work for wages, and they are not very far from getting the full franchise. The Irish question has taken on a new phase. There is a "back to the land" movement that represents a degree of reversal of the urban migration. People who used to be filled with pious horror at the thought of a man marrying his deceased wife's sister are reconsider-

ing the status of illegitimacy — in view of the presence of "war-babies" — and there has even been reported some talk, on the part of perfectly reputable people, of examining into the merits of plural marriage. Here is a catalogue, by no means exhaustive, of societal right-abouts.

The salient feat performed by the French has consisted in divesting themselves of what used to be regarded as their traditional race-character. It is now demonstrated that they are as steady and enduring as the best. They are as far as possible from being a nation of frivolous, excitable, quickly-tiring pleasure-lovers. Very likely the former accounts of them did them injustice, but there can be no doubt now that their national life runs more seriously and strongly within more secure channels than it has done before. And such a basic change draws a far-flung sequence of institutional modifications in its wake. Further, French life and societal structure are being much altered by the presence in France of representatives of almost all the nations of the earth, many of whom, we are told, mean to remain. Some fear that the very national identity of France lies in the balance.

The name Russia summons up a scene of institutional upheaval and transformation. The

outstanding fact is the passing of the Little Father and the emergence of a new set of national figures, pursuing new methods under novel and even weird compulsions. Mother Vodka is banished as Mother Breshkovskaya returns. The mujik has been torn out of his isolation, where the dunghill before the hut has been the most prominent feature on the horizon of a sordid life, and has been not only smartly uniformed and drilled to stand erect, but also transported to unknown countries and his eyes perforce opened to unfamiliar things. His head has been filled also with undigested economic and social theory, and has reacted upon this pabulum in fantastic and unedifying ways. But it is clear that he will never again be what he was or settle down contentedly to the old life. Russia may be an incalculable variable for some time to come; but the limit it approaches can never be that status ante bellum. For the deeps have been stirred.

If the French have divested themselves of their traditional race-character, the Germans have done no less. I do not need to go into the repulsive tale; it is enough to say that the manifestations of German manners and morals were received by the world with utter incredulity until the evidence became irresistible. It is a question sometimes

debated whether this barbarity was or was not in the national make-up; whether there was any real change here or merely a revelation. It looks as if Germany was so ready for predatory war that not much adjustment to its conditions was necessary. It is all a question of whether the people have been with their rulers or not; and the consideration of that question must be postponed for the moment. There have been recurrences of unrest in Germany, followed by ostensible yieldings and cajolery on the part of the government; but opinion as to what is really occurring, or about to occur, must remain, in the absence of trustworthy evidence, largely inferential, or based upon general considerations.

And we know as little about what is happening in Germany's vassal states, except that, whatever it is, it is directed or countenanced from Berlin. There are indications that sections of the Alliance are somewhat restive under an inexorable control that holds them from making adjustments which they are not loath to contemplate. Not Turkey — for she has no qualms in remaining what she is and has been — but the Dual Empire, and even Bulgaria, give signs of concern over the state in which they find themselves; and neither the one nor the other seems entirely willing to

embrace all the methods of their unscrupulous pace-setter. Only Turkey finds herself in sympathetic harmony with her own type of theory and practice.

Of all the societal changes consequent on the war none are more astonishing, though some are more dramatic, than those which have occurred in the United States. It is evident that our former "beneficent isolation" belongs to history. It suffered inroads as a consequence of the Spanish War and the brief imperialistic fever; and subsequent improvements in annihilation of distance had left it but a shell. Industrialism under isolation has ceased, for us, to represent adjustment to our national life-conditions. This the war has revealed. And now we have swung far toward militancy, if not toward militarism.[1] A few years ago a military and naval budget of a few hundred millions was considered scandalously high, and, indeed, inconsonant with the spirit of American institutions; twenty, or even ten years ago, the man who proposed conscription might as well have suggested having a king. And now we approve almost unanimously a budget of billions and compulsory service — if the votes of Congress, the sentiment of the press, the general acquiescence

[1] For the distinction here made between the two terms, see p. 126.

and even enthusiastic support of the people, and the spirit of the national army may form a basis for judgment. There can be no question about our so-called industrialism having experienced a shrewd and rugged wrench in the direction of militancy. In the face of a menace and a need, our society has stirred uneasily, groped about after relief, pawed over the traditional expedients, and finally settled down upon the most drastic of them.

Delegation of power to the executive has surpassed anything the country has ever seen before; and an era of control over industries and of price-fixing has set in that reminds one in turn of the Middle Ages and of socialistic utopias. To a few men have been committed inquisitorial powers which would have been impossible of delegation a few years, or even months, ago. And among the startling innovations comes the movement toward economy; Cassandras who have bewailed our wastefulness now stand aghast and fall backward before the sudden realization of their wildest dreams. For there is a goodly nucleus of citizens who are making a business of saving and who are seizing the opportunity to edge the masses over in that direction. There is also a large, though indeterminate body of our fellow-citizens, male and female, who are doing something which bears

at least an appearance of usefulness — knitting in the first row of the balcony, for example — instead of employing their time and strength in exclusively non-productive or wasteful activities. We do not now hear so much of bridge and the fox-trot.

Again, a revision of policy in regard to immigration, and in particular of the attitude toward the foreign-born, is indicated. Doubts as to the unlimited efficiency of the "melting-pot" have been voiced ere now; but the revelation that some of our accessions to population — and those not the most recent, either — still harbor a feeling toward the fatherland that is somewhat warmer and more palpable and practical than sentimental reminiscence, has come as a great shock to every patriot. As a measure of common caution, a revision of easy-going and trustful methods, and of careless optimism, is demanded. Foreign languages in schools, foreign news-sheets, and foreign associations designed to keep up home-ties, not to mention more sinister purposes, are now at a discount. The advocates of restriction of immigration have been given a considerable lift.

Not to prolong this list, but one additional alteration of societal policy will be noted. It was a statesman's insight that saw in the Mexican difficulty a chance to strengthen our ties with

South America; but the war has infused an element of fellowship that has not existed before. Common danger and common resentment have fostered sentiments that are replacing the former uninformed indifference or even impatient disesteem on our part, and the resentful mortification and suspicion on the other side, with a mutual toleration, understanding, and appreciation that promise much to the interest of both parties.

This catalogue of societal changes during the war-period is not complete — something unforeseen is happening to organized forms of religion, for example — but it is probably not far from representative. With this type of event in mind, we now go on to inquire to what extent the reasoned purposefulness of the individual was responsible for its appearance.

III. AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENTS

Had the war not occurred, most of the societal changes just cited, and many another that the reader can call to mind, would not have taken place now, or perhaps at all. Very likely the Russian revolution was due in the near future; but the American swing towards militancy was not. In all cases the war-conditions were the precipitating agency. Much in the way of societal structure has been awaiting selection, or has been involved in the process, that would not have attained to a speedy verdict but for the war, with its general dislocations, revelations, and readjustments. But it is evident that the war was not started for the realization of any such purposes. The Germans did not set out to get the vote for British women nor yet to enforce economy in this country; not even the British or the Americans had either of these ends in view in entering the conflict. Germany, in fact, did not want either England or the United States to participate; she planned to have them both go

their unsuspecting, careless, and decadent way until she got ready for them. There was no purpose in the minds of any foreigners, for example, that we should adopt conscription — it is certainly no vindication of reasoned purposefulness when the actual results come to the purposers as a surprise, involving disappointment and even consternation.

The societal changes in the several countries developed automatically and impersonally in so far as the originators of the conflict were concerned. The state of war drew in its train a set of consequences; situations appeared, for the most part unplanned and unforeseen, to which the several societies secured adjustment by their respective alterations of policy. Let us look first into the process of adjustment to these situations consequent upon war, to see whether it should be called automatic or referred to the reason and purpose of the individual; then we can go back and inquire whether the state of war itself was brought about by automatically acting, impersonal forces or by those same faculties of the individual.

Broadly speaking, all adjustment of society to its life-conditions is enforced by the pain of maladjustment, or the prospect of such pain, as sensed by numbers of individuals; and it is

secured when numbers have concurred in a course of action that brings relief. But it is inadmissible to credit that action to individual reason and purpose unless a great majority, at least, of the society members have really taken in the broad situation confronting the society and have deliberately chosen the expedient that was adopted. This very rarely occurs unless the situation is exceptionally easy of visualization; and an international situation — generally foreseen by but few — is seldom, if ever, that. It is hardly fair to give credit to individual reason and purpose if only a few have really visualized the situation, and the rest have gone as the few wanted to go, under a variety of irrelevant motives. But we hasten to concrete illustration.

In England one of the aspects of the situation following on war was a growing disproportion between the sexes. In the face of the traditional division of labor by sex — into man's work and woman's work — this meant a depletion of the male labor-supply, and a depletion coincident with an increasing demand for labor. Adjustment was possible only by the elimination, or at least suspension, of the time-honored tradition. There was, however, no general comprehension of the scope of such a change; there was action, first

of all, on the part of the women. This action was unreflecting as respects the broad societal issue and was taken in response to a variety of stimuli, irrelevant to the broad situation. Numbers of women, in concerted response to the need and to the opening opportunity, entered to fill the partial vacuum, much as cooler air-currents "naturally" flow toward a cyclonic center. These women followed their interests as they felt them: economic necessity, impatience with idleness, the desire to do as others were doing, loneliness, loyalty, fear of the enemy — all these and doubtless many another motive moved the individual. The situation facing the nation was visualized, doubtless, by a few; and many went in on the basis of general patriotism — of which, as a reasoned motive, more later on. What is sometimes called the "élite" may have figured out the consequences. Probably not more than one in a thousand entered an ammunition-plant or delivered mail in order to get the vote for women; yet the furthering of the suffrage cause was one of the things that came of it. It was in good part the demonstration by women of their industrial efficiency, as well as of their patriotism, that disposed the opposition to a change of heart. It had been the enforced idleness of hand and brain, as

well as the emptiness of arms, that had goaded many women to an offensively restless activity; but now, in the face of the opening opportunities, even the militants, who had been pouring acid into mail-boxes and assaulting premiers, dropped their special purposes for the time and went to work — later to find their desires moving toward realization by way of a course of indirection foreseen by few. The fact that married as well as single women are taking their places beside men as income-earners for life threatens even man's headship of the family, as well as his monopoly of the franchise.

In cases like this (including those cited in the preceding chapter) there is a predominant element of unreasoned or even unwitting contribution to the big result. People act on impulses of various description; upon sentiments that are diffuse, customary, or habitual rather than rational and discriminating. It is usually the immediate personal interest only — generally an economic one — that is pursued with a genuinely rational and purposeful motive. Loyalty and patriotism as motives, however creditable to the individual, as well as efficient and wholesome for the nation, are not usually rational. It is necessary to be very clear here on the distinction between that

which we know to be the product of reason and that which looks, at first sight, as if it must have been.

An expedient that "works" always impresses the partially informed as necessarily due to the planful action of some person — man or god. The camel's foot looks as if it had been skilfully planned for desert use; the more exact our mathematics, says Maeterlinck, in his "Life of the Bee," the nearer do we come to the formula of cell-construction practiced in the hive. But there is no question here of anything but the unplanned and automatic. When natural selection is done, the product is always "rational"; science has always stumbled along after such facts. The nature-process issues in that which will stand to reason. But now the "social process" also can show the same sort of issue. The savages often practice what is in effect a quarantine on the house of death; they apply heat to a lame muscle to expel pain; they proscribe close in-marriage. But that any such regulations have adequate reasoning and purpose behind them few would be found to maintain. We cannot any longer accept the ghost-theory that fathered them. Such action can be adjudged rational only if observed in retrospect and in ignorance of its antecedents. So seen, there is a strong suggestion of reason;

but the reason is after the act, and is put in by the more sophisticated observer. It is clear, then, that the customary or habitual may show the same sort of rationality as the "natural," and reveal results that reason would be proud to be credited with, and sometimes tries to appropriate.

The occasion for drawing this distinction was the remark that loyalty and patriotism are not usually rational. They are matters of feeling and habit. They lie in custom. But the expediency of many such social usages is so evident, that is, they work so well, that they are credited to reason. In reality they have survived selection just as the nature-products have; only the selection is on the plane of societal, not organic evolution. It could be shown that patriotism, and even jingoism, are sentiments that serve a society well, and have thus had a high survival-value in the course of its evolution. But it should now be clear that it will not do to consider an adjustment made by society to be the result of individual purposeful reasoning because of the patriotism behind it. If so, there is nothing to show that the condition created by the disproportion of the sexes in England, a consequence of the war, evoked, in the form of a far-reaching

societal change, a reasoned and purposeful response on the part of individuals.

It is difficult to descry much response of the rational order, or much even that might be mistaken for such, in the Russian doings. The impression here is as of behemoth lurching uneasily about and making uncertain starts, now this way and now that, under the stress of undefined, ill-defined, and fleeting impulses — a vision of the crudely automatic. If adjustment comes about eventually, it will be through the lumbering and costly process of trial and failure, and that irrespective of whether or not a glittering mahout rides on the monster's head as it finally plods into some course of adequate adjustment. All varieties of unreasoned and irrational cross-purpose are here having their day.

In the United States a better informed people stands a more hopeful chance of thinking a new situation out and acting purposefully in the light of reflection. Take the movement looking to economy in living. Saving in the face of want is a pretty obvious expedient, and also it has to do with concrete and tangible things. It does not demand great intellectual tension; even the savage does it. In this country, ease in the dissemination of programs of saving, and of the

simple considerations back of them, further aids the application of reason-directed purpose. It is apparently a hard case for alignment under the automatic category. It is not denied that the controllers of food, coal, and other indispensables will be able, by their propaganda, to enlist the rational support of millions. However, even here, the presence of the impersonal and automatic can be made out clearly enough. Many will save, not because they sense the peculiar reasons for so doing, but because they will automatically cease to consume the scarce and high-priced articles. And there are many who will never accept the reasonableness of economy-programs, but, whatever they do — evade or obey — it will be done unintelligently. Reason will be enlisted by others, but only to support self-indulgence and selfishness. Such unintelligent docility or unwilling acquiescence are far from being reasoned purposefulness in the face of a recognized societal issue. Even those individuals who economize "for the country," and do not go behind the phrase, afford no evidence for the theorist who insists that societal adjustment is by way of the intelligent, purposeful action of individuals in the face of visualized and understood conditions.

The automatic element is more marked as the

case is less concrete and immediate. There are many persons in this enlightened land of opportunity who have not the imagination to visualize anything but the most concrete and immediate. Their spheres of comprehension are narrowly circumscribed, and outside are merely ambiguous forms and fantastic hopes and fears. Often, however, they will take leading readily enough, especially if they are vaguely frightened, and if the leading does not impose too great a sacrifice of immediate interests. They are not moved by any theoretical or "academic" considerations and are not critical where their feelings are enlisted. What they need to move them is suggestion, applied and re-applied. Here is the hope of the propagandist.

"Too dark and pessimistic a picture," some one objects. Perhaps so; but it must be realized that if the theory of reasoned, purposeful, individual action as the agency of society's adjustment is to be maintained, it must cover not only the "classes," but the "masses." The latter form the bulk of any society, and if it is to be moved, they must be moved. These are the people many of whom crave the yellow journal and are uncritical of its sensational appeal to the feelings and prejudices. Here are those who cannot be shown

a fact so obvious as that the potato, however scarce and costly, is not the sole food appropriate for a laborer. There are those among us who live in an adherence to tradition about as intelligent as that of any primitive tribe. There are as few of this class in this country as in any other, but they cannot fairly be ignored. They cannot be rightly included under a sweeping theory of societal adaptation as performed by the intelligent and purposeful response of individuals.

Nor, on the other hand, should a theory of automatic adaptation be so sweeping as to take no account of the relatively few thinkers. I am interested here in exhibiting the presence of the ignored automatic element rather than in claiming everything for it. It is commonly lost to calculation, but it ought not to be, for it is the basic element. It dominates even when there are purposeful reasoners in seats of power, for the reasoners cannot go ahead without reference to public opinion. Facing a situation as we do, where economy is plainly called for, many respond intelligently and at once; it may even be that such persons can, in effect, respond vicariously for the rest. But if they do that, forcing or cajoling the rest into acting as the intelligent think best, then society's adjustment

is not, in any reasonable interpretation of the case, one referable to the intellect and purpose of its constituent individuals. But, with this turn of the discussion toward the matter of leadership, we are drawn into considerations of a still more general order.

IV. A PEOPLE'S WAR

THERE is thus much reason to suppose that the several changes in societal arrangements and habitudes, effected in this and that society in adjustment to war-conditions, are typically automatic in their development. It is clear enough that most of these war-conditions, sex-disproportion, for instance, were and are inevitable, representing as they do a set of sequences set afloat automatically by the presence of war. It remains to inquire whether the war itself came about automatically or as the result of the reasoned purpose of individuals. And it should be noted preliminarily that any war becomes straightway a "people's war" if it becomes big enough and near enough to cause the people to believe, or to be persuaded, that the native land is threatened. Then they will rally to self-defense, inspired by feelings of patriotism, and can readily be shown, among other things, that a strong offensive is the best defense.

This would seem to indicate that any group of men in power, or even any one man, can at any time precipitate a war, and a popular one, by stirring up a hornet's nest and then falling back upon the people. Doubtless this has been done; Bismarck was an adept at this sort of maneuver. But the question immediately rises as to why leaders of this ilk are in power, and why they are kept in power. Their type does, or does not, represent the national will. If it does — if Germans are sure to be represented by this type of trouble-hunter — then the society must assume responsibility, the eminent individual dropping out except as an agent of the popular will. If it does not, then the inference is that this nation cannot or will not make its will felt as against its rulers, either because it has no will or because extraordinary obstacles interpose to thwart expression: the people are pathetically uninformed, perhaps, or misinformed, or hopelessly prepossessed, or so docile and suggestible as to deserve the epithet "political imbecile." There is some evidence to support any one of these hypotheses; a later chapter will be devoted to the special form of obsession to which the German people seem peculiarly susceptible.

It is a matter of comparatively small con-

sequence, seen in long perspective, that war eventuated in one year rather than another, or under one Emperor rather than another; the disharmony was sure to come to a head sooner or later, for it is a case of incompatibility between societal systems, each represented by the sort of spokesmen characteristic of it. The war came about as the result of the action of impersonal, automatically operative social forces on the order of the impersonal, automatically acting natural forces; the antics of a ruler giddy with self-importance could have been played only on a stage set for him. The sun was coming up anyhow, whether Chanticleer crowed or not.

Doubtless the despot of an unresisting, inarticulate sheep-people or *Viehvolk* could render a striking exhibition of purposeful action by the individual as the moving force in societal evolution. But this is hardly the sort of evidence to thrill the soul of the theorist whose pet views it seems to support; it looks atavistic or decadent. No one could contemplate, with proprietary pride, as grist available for his theory-mill, the spectacle of millions being led about by the national nose, even when that organ is clutched between the knuckles of no less a personage than the high priest of Odinism. There have been too

few cases of the sort in the present or the past to justify the conviction that such an one is normal, not pathological, if indeed it exists at all. And the German case is not yet closed; if there has been an incredible success in keeping a whole people uninformed, or misinformed, or under illusion, the misled may yet encounter a situation full of pain and disillusion that is calculated to spoil the completeness and perfection of the case for autocracy. The Kaiser may come to point the old Greek saying: Call no man happy till he is dead. It is a pretty far-gone imbecile that will not lash out if there is sufficient stimulus.

As a matter of fact, the German people acquiesce in, where they do not heartily support, the programs of their rulers. If they did not, these programs could not be realized or even formulated. However the national sentiment is formed or guided, the lords of affairs are powerless except as they are tolerated or supported by it. The purposeful action of the individual, however exalted he may be, is no more than a variation on the theme set by the public opinion of the society. Even assuming that the Kaiser precipitated the present war in order to harmonize elements with which he had been having difficulty, and to justify the burdensome increase

of armament, he could not have done this in another society. If the Kaiser and his circle could, by some miracle, be transferred into the executive offices at Washington, they would be powerless to make programs and create situations fraught with gratuitous menace to other peoples. And they would not hold office long. It is foolish to lay all this world-coil to individuals. To do so is to deal in mythology and adhere to magic. It is like believing that old women produce tempests by pulling off their stockings.

For there has never been a despot so securely settled on the throne and surrounded by so powerful an entourage, that he could not be shaken down by the popular will if he crossed it often or flagrantly enough. In the modern world most kings are mere figure-heads, and, like Edward VII, attain to personal influence and power only when they are popular. The old method of unseating the unpopular ruler, by revolution, is present even in our own day; but elections and other forms of "peaceful revolution" have also been devised to keep the real rulers — prime ministers and presidents — under regular control by the popular will. The whole course of society's evolution has been marked by increasingly efficient adjustments permitting of the

more unrestricted expression of that will. If the German people are in a position of impotence in this matter, the case is an exception that must have some special and vagrant course of development behind it. It is in accord with what we know of the operation of societal evolution, throughout human history, to believe, in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary, that Germany's rulers are expressing German public opinion, either present or recent, and that if they were not there to voice it, other channels of outlet would have been opened.

I say that acquaintance with the operation of societal evolution leads to this conclusion. I might have said that plain common sense points to such a conviction. But there are many things that are said to "stand to reason" which will not stand to scientific examination; in fact, the phrase "it stands to reason" is often employed as a sort of camouflage to conceal some "intuition" or some belief that is harbored merely because we want to believe it. Here is a place for the application of "trained and organized common sense," which was Huxley's definition of science. I shall now try to indicate the conception of societal evolution that goes with the belief in the predominance of the impersonal,

spontaneous, and automatic in the life of society, and to "place" in this evolutionary process the vast episode now being enacted with the whole world as a stage.

From now on we shall confine attention, to the virtual disregard of the individual and his qualities and powers, upon societies. We have taken some little account of the trees, and now propose, without denying their indispensability as components, to view the woods. We shall deal in terms of a wider intention. For if, extending the perspective, we look over and beyond the individual, we see in this world-conflict the alignment and confrontation of great societies — somewhat as Homer saw the vast forms of the higher powers seated unmoved above the fighting and dying mortals, or going about their prodigious affairs, or engaging in immortal combat. The movements of these societies, so viewed, are impersonal and automatic after the manner of gravitation or osmosis, and the individual is lost to sight, or, rather, to identification, as he blends into the composite mass. It is from such a plane that we shall now view the conflict. Thus seen, it appears as a powerful selective factor in the evolution, not alone of the several nations, but of human society itself. Here is

a vast laboratory of selection of the superorganic order — the greatest laboratory the social scientist has ever seen or heard of; for what is going on before his face is the most gigantic exhibition of that type of selection that the world has ever experienced. Now is his chance to get glimpses of the mass-motions that form the driving energies of the tremendous process.

A view of such matters in the large cannot be gained, however, without first giving some thought to the factors and processes of societal evolution in general. These should be capable, for the most part, of simple and untechnical description. In any case the next item in my program is to attempt such an exposition.[1]

[1] For a condensed statement of the author's views, of a more technical order and wider scope, see Keller, "Societal Evolution."

V. FOLKWAYS AND SOCIETAL CODES OF CONDUCT

The central figure in societal evolution is, as we shall view it, a human society. This is a group of human beings living in a coöperative effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species. Such a definition proposes for society the same functions that are familiar throughout the organic world: self-maintenance and self-perpetuation. The latter of these functions is a sort of extension, in time, of the former; society, like an animal species, could exist awhile — for a generation — without it. But self-maintenance is fundamental and primordial; it had to begin at once, and if there is going to be any species or society at all, it can never stop. In order not to complicate matters, let us fix attention, at least for the moment, upon this basic matter of society's self-maintenance.

Self-maintenance means primarily and universally the food-quest; but it involves also, for most men, the provision for protection against

the natural environment: clothing and other shelter. This item of protection, when secured, represents success in the struggle for existence as pursued against the inanimate part of the environment; and so there is another aspect of that struggle, when it is carried on against the animate part, namely, the competition of life. This is a contest against plant, animal, and fellow-man to attain or to retain that which makes existence possible, or to preserve life itself. Two main phases of the struggle thus reveal themselves, namely, industry and war for plunder. In the former the means of living are derived from the inanimate or animate environment — by hunting and, later on, by herding and agriculture; in the latter, by the appropriation of the product of the industry of others, or aggression. Always industry is the basic maintenance activity.

But the development of activities in self-maintenance is not a haphazard, discontinuous process. When the first societies of which we know appear to view, they are already provided with a set of ways, or a traditional procedure, by which they carry on this activity, and every other of their activities as well. These ways represent a concurrence of group-members in the practice

of expedients which have been proved to them, in the event, to be successful ones. These expedient ways have been called the folkways or mores. Language is one of the most typical of the mores; division of labor is another. No one planned them, but they grew up and are practiced unquestioningly, unconsciously, and automatically. They correspond to habits in the individual. Taken all together, they constitute the code of behavior of the society. They represent the proper way to act, and, although they are not subjected to any rational or critical examination, there exists the conviction that they are the only right ways, the only ones fit to live by. The mores, says Sumner,[1] who first analyzed them, "are the popular habitudes and traditions, when they contain a judgment that they are conducive to societal welfare, and when they exert a coercion upon the individual to conform to them, although they are not coördinated by any authority." It is just as well to have a technical term for them, for they are not precisely customs, or social habitudes, or ethics, or morals.

They become uniform and universal in a group,

[1] In "Folkways, A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals."

and also imperative; and, often over long periods, they are invariable. Many of them are strongly sanctioned by religion; in fact, practically all of them that are of long standing are supported by the readiness of the spirits, ancestral or other, to punish infringement or alteration. They thus come to form a prescribed body of rules of behavior for life in society that well deserves the title of "the social code."

I have already intimated that the mores extend beyond the range of self-maintenance. Within that range they determine how the struggle for existence and the competition of life shall go on, thus rising to meet and cope with certain vital and perennial life-conditions. Another inescapable and vital life-condition is laid down in the bisexuality of the human race; there are the relations of the sexes to be ordered, in the interest of the society's well-being. Innumerable mores attend to the relations of man and woman, parents and children, and they work out into various forms of marriage and the family. A big group of mores always surrounds some vital condition of society life, like that of sex, and forms the approved method of dealing with it. Another such condition, for further example, was felt in the vividly conceived presence of a

world of ghosts and spirits, an imaginary environment to which men adjusted themselves by the unplanned development of a set of mores covering forms of avoidance, exorcism, conciliation, and propitiation.

But these several sets of mores, "mere custom" at first, gradually attained a stage of organization where they became institutions, as, for example, matrimony and religion. There is no human institution that has not risen from the matrix of custom, and the rise of new institutions, now as always, is out of the same prolific source. And, as they take more definite form and somewhat disengage themselves from the mass of custom, the institutions do not lose, but carry with them, that approval and that conviction as to their indispensability for welfare that were accorded to the mores. Anything that is in our mores is right, and so our institutions are the best. "The mores," says Sumner again, "can make anything right and prevent condemnation of anything." They are the approved ways of meeting the conditions of living, developed, accepted, and practiced without the intervention of reasoned purpose.

They are to a society what, for example, density and color of fur are to arctic animals;

namely automatic adaptations to environment. Life-conditions are present and society has to live under them. This is rendered possible, or easy, or easier, by adjustments in the manner of life or ways of living. Thus we have a societal code characteristic, for instance, of the arctics or of the tropics, of isolation or accessibility, of over-population or under-population, of the country or of the city, of peace or of war.

Adaptation is the characteristic result of the process of organic evolution. It is also, though this is less commonly recognized, that of the process of societal evolution. It is never perfect; and, since life-conditions are always changing, it is never stable. Maladjustment recurs, to be followed by new adjustment by way of altered mores and institutions. This recurring adjustment is secured, in nature, through the operation of three factors: variation, selection, and heredity, all of which act, of course, automatically. By variation, diversity is secured — the members of the new generation are not precisely like those of the old, nor are they all duplicates of one another. By heredity, on the other hand, a general likeness is retained as between parents and offspring, and as among the several offspring. Heredity is the conservative

element. By selection the least adapted of any generation are weeded out, leaving the best adapted to survive. These latter are the "fittest."

A similar process, arriving at the same result, namely, adjustment to life-conditions, takes place in the life of society. Variation produces diversity in the mores and in the institutions crystallizing out of them; tradition, corresponding to heredity in the organic world, holds the type of the mores, as they are passed along; and selection weeds out the less expedient mores and institutions. The evolutionary process is, however, on another plane than that of organic evolution, and in a different mode. Its existence has been long recognized in an unconscious sort of way; for writers on society's life have frequently spoken of "social heredity" or "social selection," just as generations of naturalists before Darwin spoke of "families" of plants or animals — not realizing that such terms were more than metaphorical, or better than analogies. To make use of the point of view here taken, it is necessary to be resolved as to the nature of variation, selection, and transmission as factors in societal evolution.

Variation in the mores represents a series of tentatives, departing more or less from the ac-

cepted code, that are struck out upon by individuals in the pursuit of their interests. The individual's function is that of an agency for variation. These slight departures from the code are in evidence all the time; in fact, the society's code is a sort of average or mean or type, about which cluster the codes of classes, sects, and other larger and smaller sub-groups. The individual may adhere to a number of these sub-groups, as his interests dictate. He may belong, for instance, to the carpenters' union, the Baptist church, the Socialist party, the Masonic lodge, at one and the same time. When interests change, other and new codes may appear, some of them departing widely in character, perhaps, from the general or typical code of the society at large. In general, the rise of such variations is a consequence of discomfort under the prevailing code; interests strain toward a better realization by way of change, small or great.

Such variations may be short-lived and exhibited by only a few, or there may be a concurrence of many which carries them forward until, perhaps, the code of the society at large has been profoundly modified. Some of the variations live and some die out. Here is the fact of selection. All through history, codes and

institutions have appeared, have persisted for a time, and have been altered or have passed completely away. Since the topic of selection, and in particular selection by war, is the main interest in this present discussion, I should prefer for the moment merely to record the fact of selection, leaving the consideration of the process for special examination.

Transmission of the mores is by tradition — which, I repeat, corresponds, in the societal realm, to heredity in the organic. Tradition, like heredity, tends to repeat the type. It is brought about through imitation, either spontaneous or induced. Spontaneous imitation is a natural activity, common to animals and man, and especially marked, among human beings, in the young. The receiver of the mores, thus transmitted, wants to receive, and takes the initiative in the transfer, as when the small boy apes his father. But imitation is also capable of being induced, where there is no likelihood that it will be spontaneous, by precept and discipline. This is education, in its broadest sense. The receiver may be indifferent or even unwilling to receive, and the giver commonly takes the initiative, as, for example, in the "uplifting" of a "lower" race. Also, while spontaneous imita-

tion carries all the mores indiscriminately, education carries a more or less wisely selected body of mores. It is clear that the former is the more natural, elemental, impersonal, spontaneous, and automatic process; the latter is effective as it succeeds in reproducing the essentials, at least in appearance, of the former, but in comparison it appears artificial. It involves, it has been noted, an antecedent choice or selection from the main body of the mores: we will teach the young certain things and others we will try to keep from them as long as possible. This choice is supposed to be a reasoned and purposeful one; but such a selection has little of the sureness and severe correctness of an automatic selection.

These evolutionary factors are operative in the life of every society, from the family group to the nation. And they do not stop there. They are effective, on the grand scale, in the life of Human Society as a whole. There is a world-code that has been in the process of formation with the establishment of proximity between the nations; for that proximity, brought about by the "annihilation of distance," has meant altered conditions of life for many societies; and variations that have been demonstrated, under selection, to be expedient, have been transmitted

until enough mores have come to be held in common by all, or nearly all, to justify the term "international code" or "world-code." Variations around this code, or in departure from it, may now be originated by a whole nation, and submitted for world-wide acceptance or rejection. Slavery, for example, has been rejected, while democracy has widened its range. And of late stands forth Germany, as champion of a code that is even now undergoing the ordeal of selection. These national variations on the world-code cannot be tested up as soon as, or shortly after they appear — as Mormonism was tested up on the American national code — and the process of selection is the more imposing when it comes. We turn now to a survey of the essentials of the selective process.

VI. CONFLICT AN ESSENTIAL TO SELECTION: PEACEFUL COMPETITION

The idea of the variation and transmission of a societal code is readily grasped, though it should not be thought that these factors work out in a simple and obvious manner. But there is more difficulty with selection. The term itself causes some trouble, for there is about it a connotation of choosing which darkens counsel. In organic evolution there cannot be, of course, any question of choice; the results of natural selection are attained by elimination of the maladapted, not by any positive process. The "fit" are those that are left after the rest have been disposed of. The whole process is impersonal and automatic, in its entirety. Similarly with the most important manifestations of societal selection, if not with them all. In any case, it is necessary to start out with the idea of selection by way of elimination rather than with the misleading positive conception of selection as picking and choosing. Variations around the code appear

and come to the test. Those that cannot qualify as expedient adjustments tend to pass away, and the rest remain because nothing is done to them. The "fit" variations in the mores, like the fit organisms, are let alone to run their course. Thus the term "selection," as used in evolutionary systems, has a special sense and must be so understood.

Essential to the operation of selection is conflict. Conflict involves competition, and without it there is no test. Thus natural selection could not take place were it not for the struggle for existence out of which the better adapted forms emerge as the rest perish. Highly developed specimens of organic life do not appear under isolation, but under conditions of competition — not in Australia, for example, but in Asia. This situation is duplicated in the societal realm, for no isolated people ever developed an advanced code, that is, a high civilization. Compare Mesopotamian culture, for instance, with that of Tierra del Fuego. But where numbers of human beings come into contact, a competitive conflict is bound to occur; for all are trying to satisfy wants, and the satisfactions are too few to go round. Also it is characteristic of wants that they increase with the

satisfaction of them; if at one instant of time all human wants were satisfied, the next instant would reveal many more emerging, that could not be met. So that, in the pursuit of their interests, both individuals and societies are sure to fall into conflict. It is this conflict that brings codes of conduct and policies of living to a test and a selection.

But the mores and codes cannot fight one another. If we speak of the conflict of militarism and industrialism, we are using a figure of speech. The conflict is not between codes or institutions, but between the societies adhering to them. If the battle goes to the bearers of a certain code, that code is extended and strengthened in influence; if against them, it is weakened and may be eliminated altogether. It is the issue of the conflict that is decisive.

The conflict is of various types: military, industrial, commercial, political; but it is always a struggle to realize interests. What is wanted is the power to get rights to something, such as the franchise, a "place in the sun," and so on. We have a right to a thing when the rest will hold off and let us have it; but they will not hold off unless they are under some compulsion to do so. The power — military, civil, moral,

or other — established as the result of struggle, is that compulsion. What people want above all, barring only existence itself, is the right to realize a standard of living. This is a matter of detail-enterprise, but for a society it amounts to a slight or a considerable idealization upon the living its members are used to; it comes to involve an extension of the local code, with certain refinements upon it. But such an objective readily brings two classes in the same nation or two nations into conflict over their codes, for instance over autocracy as against democracy. Thus the codes themselves furnish a *casus belli*. They are the more likely to do that because, in the conviction that "our" ways are the only right ones, we are wont to regard those of others as ridiculous, perverse, altogether wrong, or even contemptible. This sentiment of group-egotism is called ethnocentrism.

It is plain, without going for the present into greater detail, that there are always occasions enough for conflict between societies. Now the crudest form of such conflict is common to both animals and men; it is by physical violence. This form is the one specifically before us, and must be looked into with some care; I should like to set it aside with that purpose in view

while surveying first the milder forms of human conflict. There is some advantage in considering the more evolved forms first, when we are studying a case of recurrence of the less evolved. This is, in effect, putting the cart before the horse, so far as evolutionary sequence goes; for all other types of competition are, at least among civilized peoples, modifications of an antecedent violence. They have been, in their time, variations on the code of violent conflict, and they have been subjected to selection. The fact that they have survived that test indicates that they are more expedient as adjustments to evolved life-conditions of societies than is their parent stock. But it should be noted that no evolutionary adjustments are permanent; their persistence under given conditions proves nothing about their expediency should conditions change — change back, for instance, to resemble more primitive ones. For while softened conditions can be met by gentler expedients, a recurrence of harsh conditions calls for a return to rough and crude forms of adjustment.

In considering the milder forms of conflict we are led at once before a broad adjustment which is a pre-condition to their development. This is the "peace-group," otherwise called the

"in-group" or the "we-group." A peace-group is composed of members who have enough interests in common to allow of coöperation rather than conflict in their realization. They have a common code — common, that is, in the essentials; there is no conflict over the vital things, for they are assumed in the common code, and disputes over minor matters can be carried on, generally, without breach of the peace by recourse to violence. "Men will always fight," it is said, "when they are mad enough"; but in this case the matters concerning which they could get mad enough are agreed upon by all fellow-members, so that they do not have to be fought about within the group; and over the issues of less weight, passion does not run so high.

No one ever set out to invent a peace-group. It is a typically spontaneous, automatic, and impersonal development, and one with a very high survival value; for it is by peace and order within that a society is enabled to resist destruction or to concentrate its strength in the pursuit of its interests against competitors. In fact, the very definition of a human society, as given above, implies internal peace as an indispensable condition. Thus the peace-group may be taken to be as old as humanity, and even

older, for animals form true societies. But it appears in history as a modification of an antecedent régime of violence. What we actually see in history is a progressive development of restriction on violence, both as between individuals and classes within the same society, and also as between societies. But the very prohibition of violence witnesses to the priority of violence. The general tendency, where we know war to have been the mode, has been in the direction of milder methods; there is no general or steady tendency in the opposite direction; and so the conflict by violence appears to be a heritage from the antique world. War is often spoken of as a reversion. Nations, even when at war, take pains to cast the odium of recourse to such a savage expedient upon the enemy. Public opinion is against violence and in favor of peace — but that it was not always so, can be gathered from the character of the heroes and divinities of olden time. Whether or not the primordial era was one of unmitigated violence, the extension of the peace-group, as seen in history, has represented a progressive modification of the ruder methods of conflict.

The existence of a peace-group is dependent upon the adherence of its members to a common

societal code; their major interests coincide and are being realized under the adjustments to life-conditions represented by the code. There is a conviction that group-welfare depends upon the code, and there arises a loyalty to it and a partisanship, that constitute patriotism. Such sentiments create cohesion and stability, and have, as we have seen, a high survival-value in any society's life. But this does not mean, we have already insisted, that the society's code remains forever the same. It is only the vital or salient mores that are held in common; outside of these is the inevitable variation, due to the non-uniform composition of the society. For every society or nation, however stable as a peace-group, includes classes, sects, and other constituents, each of which has, as its truly distinguishing feature, its special body of mores. The most essential of these mores receive representation in the national code; but there are minor interests enough to struggle for, in competition with other sub-groups. These competing fellow-groups are also divisible into still smaller constituents, with still more special interests and still more specialized rules of conduct. There is endless chance for conflict, selection, and adjustment within the peace-group. It

is clear that as the different local bodies unite to form the larger ones, and as they all finally join to make up the society or nation, the number of mores common to the unions must become ever smaller and their form more general. The residue to which all peacefully adhere are the few and general essentials of the inclusive code; the conflict is about minor matters and is pursued in a milder way.

I do not wish to load these pages with abstractions or generalities not bearing directly upon my main topic, nor yet with needless illustration. The milder methods of social conflict do not form the main subject of this writing, and are to be treated only as they throw light upon war-selection. However, it must be understood that war-selection comes about, in these days, when the milder methods break down; and it is therefore necessary to summon up a quite clear and definite impression of how the milder methods have been evolved and what they can and cannot do, in order to see where war comes in.

Perhaps the generalities of a code upon which a whole nation agrees, as distinguished from details of lesser importance, may be best brought out by a quotation [1] — in which the emphasis

[1] Sumner, W. G., "The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays," pp. 353–354.

upon the impersonal and automatic in the formation and acceptance of a national code should be noted. "The rights of conscience, the equality of all men before the law, the separation of church and state, religious toleration, freedom of speech and of the press, popular education, are vital traditions of the American people. They are not brought in question; they form the stock of firm and universal convictions on which our national life is based; they are ingrained into the character of our people, and you can assume, in any controversy, that an American will admit their truth. But they form the sum of traditions which we obtain as our birthright. They are never explicitly taught to us, but we assimilate them in our earliest childhood from all our surroundings, at the fireside, at school, from the press, on the highways and streets. We never hear them disputed and it is only when we observe how difficult it is for some foreign nations to learn them that we perceive that they are not implanted by nature in the human mind. They are a part and the most valuable part of our national inheritance, and the obligation of love, labor, and protection which we owe to the nation rests upon these benefits which we receive from it."

Agreeing with respect to these generalities — accepting them, in fact, without reflection — Americans experience in the rest of the national life a series of collisions of minor interests: some have wanted protectionism, others free trade; some an imperialistic policy, others the traditional policy of isolation. A long series of interests, lined up for the fray, could be mentioned: labor *vs.* capital, debtors *vs.* creditors, gold-standardists *vs.* inflationists, suffragists *vs.* anti-suffragists, "wets" *vs.* "drys"; and, on the smaller scale, religious sects, secret societies, and local organizations of all descriptions maintain an unremitting competition among themselves. Viewed from this angle, national life is a seething arena of conflict, industrial, commercial, political, religious, moral, full of petty or more than petty triumphs and reverses, entailing extensions and eliminations of petty or more than petty codes of behavior.

It remains to note that each smaller group is trying all the time to universalize its pet program, and that there is always the possibility that it may acquire a following sufficient to raise its code into a prominence from which it can challenge some of the essentials of the national code. If, then, there comes about a conflict over es-

sentials, there is in prospect a selection that may demand revolution, probably violence, and so the suspension or even the destruction of the peace-status itself. Slavery in the South was for a long time a minor national issue; but it rose into prominence, got in among the essentials, so that the nation could not exist half-slave and half-free, and was finally eliminated by recourse to war. If any local issue works up into such prominence, it transcends peaceful settlement. People have become, with the successive thwarting of interests believed by them to be essential, angry enough to fight; and as yet there is no peaceful device that has stood the test as a substitute for violence. Not for nothing has war been called the *ultima ratio.* War has always been and is now the last expedient in bringing about selection in the mores, and any other form of conflict may run out into war.

VII. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE NATIONAL CODE

The code of any peace-group must contain, of necessity, taboos on violence, and also upon conduct likely to lead to violence; otherwise the existence of the group would always be in jeopardy. "Thou shalt not kill" and "thou shalt not steal" are such taboos. Any member who transgresses these formulations of adjustment to life-conditions is removed from the group or some attempt is made to force him into harmony. The code of any peace-group whatsoever must contain these taboos as a condition of being a peace-group; this has been tested over and over throughout human history, has become traditional, and is never questioned. Other items in the code of a modern nation, such as freedom of conscience, are of much later development, having been acquired within the recent historic period. No variations are permitted that may tend to weaken these fundamentals; in fact, every variation is tested on the criterion of its consistency with the funda-

mentals. Thus is many a proposed law declared unconstitutional, that is, inconsistent with the national principles, or the genius of national institutions.

But where the fundamentals of the code are not obviously in question, a flexible and adaptable societal system will show free and versatile variation. Such variability has a high selective value, for its presence means a heightened chance of securing, through multiplied expedients, a speedy and adequate adjustment. But that result cannot come about unless unhampered freedom of expression is accorded to the producers of any new expedient for living, whereby they may seek to offer it for imitation and concurrence, spontaneous or induced, in competition with other variations. I have said that such competition aims at power, political or other; but that power can be gained only by winning over public opinion. Now, public opinion is commonly supposed to be responsive to reason, and people who accept that supposition are led to lay much stress upon reasoned and purposeful individual initiative as a moving force in societal evolution. If such a position is sound, then society practices a rational selection among its mores, and therefore a rational adjustment to its life-conditions.

It is necessary to reflect upon this matter before we go on.

In conceiving of public opinion we are all inclined to think of it as the opinion of our own circle of life, and if one's circle is composed chiefly of educated people, as is generally the case with any theoretical writer, he is apt to assume that public opinion includes a large element of the intellectual or of the rationally discriminative. But genuine public opinion cannot be anything else than the consensus of the whole society; and the vast bulk of any society is composed of so-called "common people," not at all or not very well educated, of horizons much limited, and without the time, surplus energy, or even capacity to grapple intellectually with broad and general issues. This is no indictment of those who form the solid strength of any society; in fact there are not a few of those who are regarded as intellectuals because of eminence in certain restricted fields, who are both artless and child-like when they set out to pass judgment on the societal order. The scope of any human intellect is circumscribed. Few men can deal intelligently with the broadest issues of societal adjustment. There is no immediate test or verification to go by, and it is generally only after the issue is long past

that the "verdict of history," the only sure one, can be rendered.

Public opinion, in brief, is a matter of feeling rather than of intellect; and the feeling is developed in connection with a more or less localized interest. If such interests are being realized, public opinion is favorable to or acquiescent in the societal order; if not, there is "unrest" and a threat of conflict to secure change. Men adjust consciously only to what they can see, or visualize, or think they see. This may be thoroughly irrational, as with the primitive people, who have a whole set of adjustments to a world of ghosts and demons — a construction that can withstand none of our accepted tests of reality.

And yet it is possible to contend that public opinion is prevailingly "right" — even that the *vox populi* is the *vox dei*. Public opinion supported primitive religions. We cannot at all agree with the feeling back of it. But the religions were of the highest societal effectiveness, constituting as they did, among other things, a powerful disciplinary factor just when and where discipline was most needed. They had a high survival-value and public sentiment was "right" in supporting them. Society automatically used the public opinion, intellectually mistaken as it

was, with the result of securing adaptation to conditions that really existed, and to them as they existed. Men in those elder ages never saw the societal expediency of their religion; it was all the time being put to uses quite other than those which had won it the favor of the public. No matter whence or how they arose, or how they were viewed by the individual mind, the religious institutions represented a real adjustment to life-conditions, and therefore persisted, surviving all sorts of selective tests along their course.

I do not wish to say that enlightenment has not enabled a modern society to proceed more intelligently and consciously toward its destiny; but any one who faces the facts will have to conclude that intelligent and conscious action is still, among the masses of mankind, confined for the most part to local issues and even to personal exigencies. The wider view is the rare view; it is, for example, the view of the statesman as contrasted with that of the "practical politician." Most of us are but little concerned in action that contemplates a distant or universal result; few people can take a deep intelligent interest in a social program, like that of eugenics, which aims at an improvement of the whole human race some centuries hence. The human tendency is to

shrink such a program down to a proximate, immediate aim; to make it bear on the present situation, and upon the local interest of the adherent.

Certainly the adjustment of a nation's code, let alone that of a race, to life-conditions is one of those matters that transcend the mental outfit and powers of most, if not of all men. How, then, can public opinion be trusted to settle such an issue? The answer is, because the process is typically automatic and impersonal, of a larger potency than any intellect-directed process can be, and must of necessity work out into adjustment.

Consider the adjustment secured by natural selection, which is so apt that it was at first unhesitatingly ascribed to infinite intelligence, and so rational in its outcome that the best brains of mankind have been employed for centuries in simply following out the process and seeing how it was done. Science has limped along after natural fact; after the act it has offered, at length, its rational explanation; but would it trust itself, even now, to vie with the process which it has followed and learned?

What science has learned is how things are and how they go, in the natural order. These processes cannot be altered, but they can be fallen in

with, or adjusted to, with the result of human well-being. There is here no negation of the value of human knowledge and of action in its light. And the case is similar in the societal realm. The process, here too, is "right" as the natural process is "right" because it is of the same impersonal, elemental nature. The test is, in one case as in the other, the magnificently simple and conclusive one of persistence or non-persistence. Our business is to learn how things are and how they go, in the societal order; these processes, like the natural ones, cannot be altered, but we can fall in with them, or adjust to them, with the result of societal well-being.

Recurring now to public opinion, which comes near to being the elemental force in societal evolution, we find it based upon sentiment and interest rather than upon intellectual analyses of complicated conditions. Upon interest — but here is precisely the touchstone of society's adjustments: do they subserve interests or do they not? Each local group, while incompetent to survey the interests of the whole society, is clear enough upon its own immediate status, for it has to live from day to day in that status, and it knows without much cerebration whether life is comfortable or not. It is the only agency that

can pass upon that question; for it is well-nigh impossible for a member of one group to see the life in another as a member of the latter sees it. If each group is to judge of its own interests, the responsibility lies precisely where the real experience is. The resulting inferences as to what ought to be done may be wrong; in fact, through the suggestion of interested parties a group or class may be persuaded that it has cause for discontent when none would be felt if it were let alone; but it is just the virtue of the automatic process that under it such unrealities at once encounter, along with the realities, an unplanned test by conflict. If there is anything in proposed variations of the code, it will come out, at length; if there are only phantasms, they will be dissipated under the test. If all the interests, locally felt and locally defended, have their chance within the arena marked out by the limits set in the national code, the composite product of the consequent selection, neither foreseen nor planned by any one, will represent a more expedient adjustment for the whole society. And if the arena is too narrow, or the restriction too cramping, that too will take care of itself; the pressure of discontented groups is bound to increase under repression until the conflict issues in a revolu-

tionary modification of the broader outlines of the society's code, or even in the violent disruption of the peace-group itself. Adjustment to life-conditions is a necessity of life, for organism or society. It is bound to come.

The peace-group, as we have seen, is an expedient for living whose efficacy is unquestioned by any one except, perhaps, certain crazy anarchists. But its adaptability, through freedom accorded to public opinion, has been a matter of growth. At an early period in the world's history it was not in the mores to allow of the free expression of general opinion. "Sit down thyself and cause the rest of the people to sit down," suggests Odysseus, blandly, to the excited noble, "for not yet dost thou clearly know what is the mind of the son of Atreus"; but with the common man he uses harsher measures, and thunders: "Sit still and harken to the words of others who are your betters! On no account shall all the Achæans be king here. Not good is the rule of many; one is to be leader, one king." Yet even in Homer's time, and in war, the assembly of the people could make itself felt by peaceable means, even though the threat of violence lay not far away.

The course of civilization has been marked by a

progressive enlargement of the range of expression accorded to the popular will. This has assured the stability of peace-groups to a higher and higher degree, for it has amounted to enlarged opportunity for the realization of interests without resort to violence. It is the justification for a freedom of speech almost bordering upon license, that popular discontent may thus blow itself off into thin air and do no such damage as it might if confined. Limitation of freedom of expression is popular only when the group-code and the sentiment of patriotism supporting it are endangered and outraged.

Formerly, then, there was little apparatus for the expression of public opinion. The society was conceived to be in the hands of its rulers. Theoretically the Homeric king was the only person who had a right to speak, even in the assembly, and if any one else wanted the floor, he had the privilege conferred upon him by being handed the royal scepter. The assembly of all tribal members, in earlier European times, often had no other mode of expression than applause or silence in the face of an announcement of intent. But this state of inarticulateness was succeeded by the evolution of various devices — into the detail of which we need not go — which limited the power of the

ruler by allowing registration of the popular will. When the king ceased to be a religious fetish and lost "divine right," there fell away, for the emancipated peoples, a formidable barrier to the free expression of public opinion.

The modern form of adjustment in this matter of enfranchising public opinion is democracy, where, as the etymology of the term indicates, recognition is accorded to no ruler at all except the *demos* or people. But no society can get along without an executive of its will. There has always been an executive of the society's code; the only difference between types of executive worth mentioning in this connection has lain in the degree of responsibility imposed. The executive is but a man, and he belongs to some class in the society. If not responsible, he may try to impose a capricious personal will or the special code of his class. As a matter of fact, there was always a limit to this sort of thing, even if it had to be established by assassination. Deposition of some sort has been common enough under unlimited monarchies. Under the constitutional monarchy, the constitution or charter of rights laid down the essentials of the national code, and the executive was held responsible for its defense and upholding, as well as limited to action within

it. If he or his class abused their position of power to tamper with the code of rights, there was always the expedient of revolution. But, in the recession from violence or from situations fraught with the threat of violence, all of which menaced the very peace-group itself, the device of "peaceful revolution," or election, arose as a better adjustment. Nowadays the executive — president or premier — is subject to periodic examination at the bar of public opinion; the issue is as to whether he has executed its mandates or not. Meanwhile the king, where there is one, is a survival except as he symbolizes continuity, and in some other relatively unimportant respects.

The election, though it is associated with persons, is essentially a selection in the details of the national code — details surrounding the unquestioned essentials to which allusion has several times been made. Some elections are frankly the decision of an issue, as, for example, woman-suffrage; and the party platforms sometimes make a clear presentation of an issue, as where protection and free trade have stood over against one another. A party espouses a certain type of societal policy and draws its adherents from certain well-recognized groups in the population that have, or think they have, interests in common.

A revolt against the traditional code may bring about a new alignment, as in the case of the Progressives. However, when certain men have been elected, while it is understood that their special policies are to prosper with them, they are yet bound to uphold the national code and to look after the essential interests of all their constituents, of whatever political faith. The representatives are those to whom is delegated the selective power of public opinion, so far as their constituencies go, but the delegating body can hold them responsible, for it has regularly recurring opportunities to continue or discontinue its representatives. The move toward the referendum and recall indicates discontent with the traditional system of representation, and impatience over having to wait awhile for a chance to rebuke and change representatives. It is an important new variation at the end of a long line of development, some of whose intervening phases we have reviewed, stretching from an era of restriction of the popular voice toward ever greater freedom.

Election is the typical modern method by which societal selection is accomplished within the peace-group, and an altered adjustment is attained. It is not asserted, however, that a single such expression of public opinion must be "right." The

candid examination of an American election [1] makes one dubious as to the efficacy of public opinion to secure expedient societal adjustments by this method. It can be swayed to a considerable extent by interested and unscrupulous parties — let one refer to Lecky on the function of the demagogue in a democracy,[2] or to Sumner on "Legislation by Clamor." [3] But we have as yet no surer device for appraising public sentiment within a peace-group. It is needful for any one who wishes to see what there is in any evolutionary process to realize that much has been done in the lapse of time which we cannot perceive going on under our eyes. We have gained many an expedient adjustment of society at the hand of public opinion when, to contemporaries, it appeared that the popular will, in the contradictoriness of its expressions, practically cancelled out. A societal process must be allowed its time and be viewed over a long perspective; it should not be judged by a series of isolated and perhaps erratic swings. Only it cannot be accredited with purposeful rationality in the attainment of adjustments, and least of all can it be

[1] For a brief account of the election as a method of societal selection, see Keller, "Societal Evolution," pp. 105–114.

[2] "Democracy and Liberty," I, 22–23.

[3] In "The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays," pp. 186–187.

referred to the individual. It shows a general trend and some very actual results, when viewed over a long enough course and in perspective. Evolution does not produce perfection. It does not even bring forth a superlative, but only comparatives. Before despairing, one should always compare the evolutionary product with what went before. Defective as the election is, in isolated instances, one would be a bold man to advocate going back to the theory and practice out of which this freer expression of public opinion once developed.

On the face of it, and in short perspective, the lodgment of power in a few individuals, or even in one autocrat, seems to attain an efficiency toward which a democracy vainly strains. And yet, to go back to a monarchical system would be to return to a superseded societal form.

VIII. THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE-GROUP

HITHERTO the peace-group has been taken to include, at most, a nation, and the social code to be, as its widest, a national code. But the peace-group has shown an ampler extension than this; empires have become veritable peace-groups, when covered by the *Magna Pax Romana* or the *Magna Pax Britannica.* With such cases in mind the conception of the peace-group may be much expanded. But I do not want to stop short, in the present instance, of the widest practicable application and implication of much that has been set down in preceding pages. If "human brotherhood" is ever realized, the peace-group will be coterminous with the world. However, not to consider utopias, let us put some such question as this: Have not civilized nations, at least temporarily, actually formed a grand peace-group; and is there not in existence, even now, an international peace-group and also a code of civilized nations, covering essential international

adjustments, to which all civilized nations have at least professed adherence?

Whether or not civilized nations have been at war for fully as much of their time in the modern period as in former ones,[1] it appears that warfare between nations, where the contending parties have both been representatives of high civilization, has been progressively less frequent. And it certainly seems safe to say that war has not taken place over such a variety of issues, some of them relatively trivial, as was formerly the case. It has not taken place at all, in recent times, without assertions of reluctance on both sides and without mutual accusations, between the enemies, of having transgressed certain traditional norms of conduct. Such transgression must constitute, it is assumed, in the eyes of all civilized peoples, guilt deserving of punishment. Peace is in the international mores; whatever may be said of the actuality of war, the tradition respecting international relations of civilized peoples assumes a peace unbroken save under the most exceptional circumstances. The fact that "confidence-men" attain success is no proof that most people are dishonest; quite the reverse, for that success is attained because people confide in one

[1] See Woods and Baltzly, "Is War Diminishing?"

another's honesty. Germany's doings do not witness for the non-existence of an international code, but prove rather that most nations were depending upon such a code, with its tradition of international conduct, as on a very real and trustworthy thing.

In so far as this tradition has represented the facts, the civilized nations have formed an international peace-group; and even when the tradition has not been followed by all, it has yet borne witness to a tendency towards the formation of such a group. The very circumstance that appeal was made, even hypocritically, to a tradition of international behavior, indicates that a set of international mores has at least been in process of formation. There was no law to appeal to. It has been asserted with much justice that, despite university courses in the subject, there is no international law; but all civilized nations have recognized a body of international precedents, and there has even been an effort to legalize them by setting up an international tribunal. Evidently there has been *rapprochement* of an international nature, which exhibits all the essential marks of an at least incipient peace-group. This societal expedient, beginning in the primitive family, has extended to include tribe, nation,

and even empire; and it seems not yet to have exhausted its scope. The international peace-group, if it has not arrived, has gotten well along in the process of becoming.

There is no inherent reason why the extension of the peace-group must be limited by national boundaries. It is an adaptation to conditions of living presented to human society; and if it has shown undoubted survival-value for ever larger and larger societies, and has successfully transcended boundary after boundary, the inference is that there is no limit to its expediency set by the increasing size of the compounded societal group. But it is also evident that, since the peace-group is made possible only by the fact that its members possess essential mores and interests in common, so that they may all adhere to a broad code in the matter of the essentials of conduct, competing as respects minor interests without violence — it is evident, I say, that each extension of this group involves greater complexity and refinement of adjustment. The larger the peace-group, as we have seen, the fewer the mores held in common by all parties. The code of the large peace-group is composed of few items; more interests have to be settled by competition; and so there is always more chance that violence will break out.

One of the essentials of a stable peace-group is that its constituent parts shall understand each other, at least in a general way. This is one of the fundamental reasons for insisting upon a single national language; the peace-group that can place that one of the mores in its code adds immensely to its stability. Compare the British and the Dual Empires in the matter of their stability, and note the efforts of Germany to further the assimilation of Alsace-Lorraine by forcing out the former tongue. But all such insistence upon homogeneity in the national unit accentuates its individuality; and that makes the formation of a larger international composite the more difficult. The more perfect the organization of the national peace-groups, and the more settled and definite their codes, the more trouble is there bound to be in the construction of an international peace-group. It is like trying to secure a general agreement among adult persons of pronounced convictions and individuality.

Aside from the obvious difference in language, the separate nations have never understood one another very well, and their divergences have been emphasized by their ethnocentrism. No wonder, therefore, that the adjustment to civilized society's life-conditions represented by an international

peace-group is as yet an imperfect one. It could never have appeared at all except for the previous partial conquest of numerous barriers calculated to keep nations apart and unable to understand one another. These barriers were such as prevented or hindered the inter-transmission of the mores, and their conquest was at the hand of agencies, for the most part automatically developed, which furthered such transmission.

Of all the agencies which have brought groups of men into proximity so that they could know and learn from one another, become similar, tolerant, or even, at length, friendly, by far the most effective is trade. Doubtless the first peaceful meeting-ground of tribes and nations was the market. The development of trade has been a thoroughly and typically natural and automatic movement, directed by immediate self-interest and with no purpose in view except the realization of definite, material ends. Yet, although the trader directly and consciously assaulted no one of the barriers to peace and the mutual assimilation of codes, he ended by undermining and levelling most of them. He transmitted products, then processes, then mores in general, between nation and nation. I need not go into the detail of this transmission, which

resulted in a spreading similarity in civilization and a consequent lessening of the feeling of strangeness and hostility. Other agencies of transmission operated along with trade, the most modern of these being, perhaps, the novel. Most people know little of Russia, for example, outside of what Turgenev, Dostoyevski, and other Russian writers have told them. The net result of all the inter-transmission has been the possibility of the *rapprochement* of which I have spoken. When that possibility emerged, the automatic drift of civilized nations was toward an agreement upon essentials, and a shifting of conflict from its violent phase into an industrial, commercial, or other peaceable competition.

This is, on the larger scale, what happened in the formation of the more limited peace-group. There are essentials upon which all combining elements at least profess to agree; then there are the minor matters concerning which they remain in constant, but peaceful conflict and competition. But nations are not so willing to sign away portions of their independence as are constituent groups within the same nation; there is not the same mutual confidence, nor is there the same apparatus of centralization. Nearly all groups in this country are willing to abide by the decisions of

the Supreme Court; but when it comes to an international court of arbitration, certain reservations are made, for example, touching questions of national "honor." No nation is sure that all of the essentials of its code are going to be represented in the official international code which such a court is designed to interpret.

Each nation is concerned for its interests because the comparatively few items of the international code have to be stated in comprehensive and therefore somewhat vague terms, and seem susceptible of a variety of interpretations. And there has been developed no system for checking up the international authorities, in so far as they may be taken to exist at all. The whole organization of the international peace-group is, in brief, inchoate and unstable, and public opinion, without reasoning that out, feels it and becomes wary of committing itself. Perhaps if there could have been a world-empire of some sort, corresponding to the original despotism of the group-chief, there would have been something definite and actual to check and modify, as there was in the case of the smaller society. The case is always more natural where there is something positive upon which to use negative, restrictive methods, than where there is something to build up out

of chaotic materials. Most human institutions are formed as the statue is freed from the rugged block, by hacking, and at length chiseling away the jagged corners and unlovely attachments that imprison the real figure, as someone has expressed it, within the originally rude mass.

Yet there has been, in peace-group forming, something original and crude to hack at and to chisel down, and that was the general savagery of former international relations. The rude and shapeless block, in the case of any human institution, has been always a chaotic mass of mores, and the drill and chisel have been the taboo. The taboo has been the great institution-shaper. Let us desert, for the time, the apparently dubious recent projects aimed at the creation of an international peace-group, and look into the process from the other end, trying to follow somewhat up its line of evolution. This will lead us to consider the modification of the earlier forms toward what we have, rather than to speculate upon what we can do, by taking thought, or to worry over what seems, in our disillusionment, impossible.

IX. THE INTERNATIONAL CODE

We start, then, from the violent conflict between tribes and nations and are to follow its modifications toward peaceful competition. Always out of the war-element have sprung variations making for peace; and, though we cannot often see the why and how, it is yet an undeniable fact that they have survived and replaced mores of violence. The methods of the violent conflict itself have been altered toward mildness. Once warfare was like the chase and utterly unregulated by any taboos. There was no warning declaration, no quarter to the vanquished, no chivalry of any sort. Poisoned springs, poisoned thorns planted upright in the path, or poisoned weapons were common enough in war-practice. Any method was good that secured the result. But long ago all this was altered: then declaration came seldom to be omitted, prisoners were adopted or enslaved, and the duel or the gantlet gave a captive at least a theoretic chance. Odysseus could get no poison in Ephyre to anoint his arrows withal, for the

man to whom he applied would not give, fearing the immortal gods. The other forms of poisoning, assaults without warning, mutilation, torture, and many another savage custom were superseded. The rules of war were developed — rules that a proper man or tribe would not think of infringing. For most savage peoples war became, in a certain rude sense, a gentleman's game. Punctilios grew up along these lines until warfare became as humane, courteous, and high-minded as such a practice could well be.

There were developed also small oases or nuclei of peace, in the shape of truces for burying the dead or for other purposes, and treaties of alliance, offensive and defensive. In connection with trade, and sanctioned by religion, there grew up several types of peace — the market-peace, the temple-peace, the Peace of God. The mutual suspicion that is revealed so significantly in "dumb barter" or "silent trade" was allayed, so that merchant and customer trusted themselves in one another's proximity, even unarmed. Disputes came to be discussed and smoothed over, revenge for injuries sustained was commuted into property-payments. The apparatus, personnel, and methods of diplomacy began to appear. Numerous courteous forms of inter-group communication sprang up —

forms often empty in the fact, but whose existence was significant of conciliation rather than of defiance or indifference.

Further and more detailed agreements came to be made, as the centuries passed, concerning the occasions and methods of war-making, concerning trade in all its aspects, "freedom of the seas," spheres of interest or influence, religion, extradition, immigration, copyright, the mails, and thousands of other matters, smaller and greater. By many agreements of this order, and potentially by each of them, there was averted an unmistakable possibility of resort to arms. They were nearly all, therefore, in effect taboos on violence, and, as such, constructive of peace. Among civilized nations they came gradually to constitute a series of traditions or precedents, and behavior in accordance with this code became the mark of the civilized nation or a member thereof.

Further transmission of the mores, possible now that nations might be at peace for protracted periods, and might come, through the development of trade and communications, to be ever better acquainted with one another, led to concurrence of all in variations developed by some. The Germans speedily adopted the Ameri-

can invention or process; the Americans visited the German cities to study their municipal administration with a view to adapting and adopting it. Especially did the New World send students to the Old, to acquire learning and polish of manners. Many departments of societal life, but especially the economic, took on an essential similarity over the civilized world. It was a case of concurrence in selected variations which, as the event proved, secured better adjustment to the life-conditions of the several societies.

And among the sweeping adjustments was the democratic state, of which I have spoken; freedom of public opinion and the control by peoples of their own destinies, by way of parliamentary government, came to be the mode in the civilized world.

In a still more general way, the evolution of society led toward the supersession of mediæval methods resting upon suspicion of machiavellian policies on the part of the governments of fellow-nations. All could not be trusted to general sentiments of mutual fairness, good-will, and friendship, however insistently these were voiced upon public occasions; but a nation's honor was supposed to be involved in the keeping of its voluntary engagements, and it was almost if not

quite unheard-of that a government should not try to prove that it had been honorable, even though it had not. That degree, at least, of deference to the international code could be counted on.

For there was here, in actuality, such a code. I have not aimed at exhaustiveness in the preceding sketch of the mores that developed within the international group. The group was an imperfect thing, and the code was not imperative in anything like the same degree as a national code with a government behind it. It could not be that, in the past or present, and may never be so. But it is plain enough that civilized nations have been long on the way toward an automatic ordering of their joint destiny — long on the way, to secure even so imperfect a result as the one before us, with the inferential prospect of remaining yet long on the way before it can be realized in any perfection — plainly, however, on the way, if a long enough sweep of societal evolution is surveyed.

Now it is possible to get a sense of the real existence of an international code by asking why a certain nation, say Turkey, is not included within the concourse of civilization. The former Armenian massacres, together with many another

sinister performance, rule her out. And why? Because such things are forbidden by the civilized code. Russia's pogroms, and the general character of her government, were hardly outweighed by certain positive qualifications. But Japan was of the group. The disqualifications are easier to name than the qualifications for membership. It is a harder task to determine what conduct is consonant with a code than what is not; for the code, from the Decalogue down, is couched, if reduced at all to form, in the negative — Thou shalt not.

In general, it is to those same mores which enable a smaller society to hold together in adjustment to life-conditions that nations must cling, if they are to form, or while they form, even temporarily, a peace-group. We have seen that the two taboos on killing and stealing have had to be enforced as a condition of societal survival. But all such taboos confer rights; the two just mentioned confer respectively the right to life and the right to property within the peace-group — not outside, for peace is preserved only within the boundaries, and it has always been laudable to kill and rob the member of the "out-group." Similarly, all the taboos connected with any code confer rights of one kind or another upon the

adherents of the code, that is, the members of the peace-group in question. And there is a duty corresponding to each such right, imposed upon each group-member, namely, to support the right conferred. In a stable peace-group any member may be called upon to help enforce the code and punish its transgressor — to enforce and punish by violence, if need be. The extreme of individual punishment is always exclusion, permanent or for a term, from the society. The laws, being the crystallized part of the code, carry a threat of such punishment for conduct varying widely from the norm. Minor offenses against local codes are visited with ostracism, ridicule, and other milder penalties.

It is now proposed to do something analogous in a wider field — something in the line of enforcement of the international code through the projected League to Lnforce Peace. We are not interested here in programs, but in historic fact. The fact is that each of the nations now belligerent claims to be fighting because it, or some other member of the concourse of civilized nations, has been injured as respects some right guaranteed by the common code. But this implies that the international peace-group ought to have been able to make good its guarantee without any one

resorting to arms, and that it has failed. And that implication introduces the query as to whether an enlarged peace-group can assure any international rights by peaceful means.

But now the international peace-group has not yet taken form sufficiently to have developed apparatus for guaranteeing anything. Even the very ancient nation had a king into whose hands the mores were delivered for safeguarding; but there is no corresponding international functionary. There is no executive. There is also no law-making body, nor yet a judiciary whose authority is habitually deferred to. If we ask what rights the international peace-group might claim to secure — which is equivalent, as we have seen, to inquiring as to what taboos there are in the international code — we find that these latter are nowhere stated in authoritative guise, as in a constitution. They are not codified in specific form; they are not even recorded in a generalized form. Some authors have sought to assemble international cases or to generalize upon international usage in some particular field, but no recognized codification has emerged.

The international political or governmental organization — the apparatus for international control — is where the organization of the national

peace-group was some time ago. There is, among civilized nations, a common public opinion, and that public opinion can and does distinguish between civilized and other conduct. There are also precedents based upon former settlements, secured by conflict or compromise between two or more nations. But that is all there is. For enforcing its behests the "judgment of civilization" is provided with no current and usual means short of violence or the threat of violence.

Nations stand toward one another a good deal as individuals or small societies stood, before the advent of enforceable law; they strive to realize their own interests with small heed to the wider interests of the corporate body of which they are coming to form a part. They make common cause with, or fall into disagreement with their fellows, according as their lasting or shifting interests harmonize or antagonize. The result is large-scale alignment or opposition, on the order of the party alliance and opposition within the better organized smaller peace-group. But there is no way of really settling differences short of force. There is no parallel to the election, but at best a veiled military menace. Ententes, understandings, treaties, balancings of power are the only devices for preserving the peace —

between the contracting parties as well as between the alliance and awed outsiders — and these associations are only as strong as their weakest links, their least interested members. They are often also secret arrangements, a fact which leads of course to mutual distrust and suspicion. They are untrustworthy and always imply a threat of violence. They are very far inferior to the arrangements for securing the rights of component parts, as developed in the older and smaller types of the peace-group. There is, in a word, no international organization of control. There is a recession from war as a means of settlement, but there is nothing definite and reliable to take its place.

There is only the diplomacy that finds its expression in the treaties and other arrangements alluded to. This factor, however, is not to be despised. I have quoted some one who said: "If peoples are mad enough, they will fight;" and the speaker added: "If they aren't, the ordinary means of diplomacy will do." That is, diplomacy will secure peace up to a certain point, and on the minor issues. It may prevent a minor issue from becoming, through misunderstanding and excitement, a major one. It is full of compromise and of the *quid pro quo*. It is like the settlement out

of court. It helps to make precedents, and has been of solid utility in preventing conflict. But it represents no real control. It has no organization and is generally an affair of two nations rather than an international thing. It shows a set of variations in international mores rather than a settled institutional form. Its practice represents international politics rather than international statesmanship.

But its out-reachings are promising, as the variation is always prophetic of better adaptation. Once there was no diplomacy to speak of, and what there was lay between small isolated tribes; now its field has expanded and it is doing for the larger groups what it once did for the smaller. There it led to closer and closer agreements and to alliances; and it is the basis, as we have seen, of the ententes and other wide *rapprochements* of great nations. It undoubtedly prevented tribal wars and spread mutual knowledge and tolerance; and it has unquestionably staved off international conflict and brought nations into alliance for a common cause. It has also improved in quality, until, in the most enlightened hands, it has ceased to be a mere art of trickery and double-dealing; the diplomat is supposed to guard the honor of his country. It is a shock to the civilized

world when an accredited representative of a civilized nation takes advantage of the hospitality accorded him to exhibit the traits of uncivilization. In such a case, the government that sent him hastens to disavow and punish his action, at least in form, unless it wishes to recognize him, and it, as correctly representing his country of origin and its degree of civilization. However, diplomacy is not the definite thing that can replace violent conflict between nations, as the political competition has displaced the conflict in arms within the range of a centralized governmental control. International competition has not yet arrived at any settled form of combination representing an adjustment that renders the primitive form of militancy obsolete.

Within the smaller peace-group, with its political competition, the peace is to be kept, whoever wins. Nothing such appears in the larger group. One nation is overreached in diplomacy, and at once gets ready to adjourn to another arena where diplomacy is not. But within both smaller and larger groups there is a further form of peaceful competition, the industrial and commercial, or, to cover both terms with one, the economic. It is very largely in connection with this form of conflict that diplomacy has been developed. Com-

mercial competition, in earlier times, was a development out of war-competition, and readily ran back into the violence out of which it came. Piracy was a sort of reverse side of early trade; for a long time the violent form persisted alongside the peaceful one, and the merchant was trader or pirate according to circumstances. Trade wars were common even after the world-market began to develop; every rival nation was after a monopoly, which was successively held by force, and lost to force, by Venetians, Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch. Then came agreements of various sorts, arranged by diplomatic agents, and accompanied by the growth of the sentiment that they must be lived up to.

When the international competition became also industrial, that is, when a market was sought for the products of national industries, the conflict became even keener. But the competitors clung to peace as to an indispensable condition. In the economic field the trade-war was no longer a matter of guns. There was talk about trade following the flag, while the world was not as yet partitioned off into spheres of influence and colonies; but latterly it was seen by most civilized nations that, despite tariff barriers and other artificial hindrances, economic success went to

the nation that could most efficiently produce and most skillfull market its wares. The economic competition was what engaged the attention of the most advanced nations, and the possibility of a resort to violence seemed, for the most part, remote. Few realized that Germany could not be content with her rapid and regular successes in this competition, but was eagerly awaiting the day when she might destroy the great rival upon whom she was pressing, in legitimate wise, so closely. There was here, in form at least, a close approximation to the conditions obtaining in a real peace-group.

As I have said, there was no controlling and guaranteeing international organization. Confidence in living on safely under keen economic competition rested in agreements of various sorts, guaranteed solely by the good faith of their makers. It was in the mores that nations should keep their word and serve their own honor. A "decent respect for the opinion of mankind" demanded that. It was so much a matter of course that, when one of the competitors turned out to be treacherous, the rest were taken almost completely by surprise.

It is not to be understood that the nations were looking out for one another's interests, in an

altruistic way. That was not the reason for even that unparalleled British freedom of trade under which alone the economic successes of other nations in the world-market became possible. No nation was ready, with self-abnegation, to fight another's battle, or in any way to support a competitor against its own interest. No nation cared to interfere with another's mores, for example with polygamy, in a purely disinterested way. It was precisely because each was pursuing its own interests and securing agreements that furthered them that, as in the smaller peace-group, the interests of all were in the proper hands and came to be realized to a degree permitting of content under the system. Nations, like classes, knew their own interests best, and in confining their attention to realizing them, were trying to do precisely what they were best fitted to do.

The query emerged above as to whether there were any rights conferrable by the international peace-group, aside from the exercise of a violence, or the threat of such, which, in action, would render the group no peace-group at all. It was found that the "judgment of civilization" was provided with no traditional means for enforcing its behests short of violence or the threat of it. The only other means in sight has been an auto-

matic recession from economic relations with a nation that might exhibit signs of economic untrustworthiness. In the economic competition, however, civilized nations have found honesty and honor, or at least the counterfeit presentment of such, so good a policy that there has been little sinning, among themselves, against it. The opposite qualities have been the mark of uncivilization that no nation wished to bear. To keep agreements has been one of the basic qualifications for membership in the concourse of civilization. The possibility of ordering existence within any peace-group is dependent upon the presence of that practice in the mores. If the sword is to be renounced, there must be something dependable in its place. Until the nature of the German code stood revealed, the world thought it had something dependable in its international treaties and covenants. Let us consider briefly the nature of that code in the light of which they meant nothing.

X. THE GERMAN CODE

No nation, in the pre-war period, was succeeding better in the commercial and industrial competition between the nations than was Germany. It was she who injected into that competition an organization and system before unknown. The hard-headed English business man of the past, largely unaided by his government, had opened wide foreign markets with unparalleled success. The English method of trading abroad has been described as "individualism gone mad." It is only in relatively recent years, and then under the stimulus of German competition, that the British government has lent regular and systematic support to the British merchant.

The German method was systematically paternalistic. The individual German trader was, indeed, practical and systematic; and he has been aided at every turn by government-fostered corporations and other trade-promoting agencies, and also directly by the state itself. "The one characteristic of the trade organization

of Germany," wrote Professor Bishop, in the *Atlantic* for May, 1914, "which makes more toward efficiency than anything else is the co-operation which exists between the government, on the one hand, and the business interests on the other."

There have been in Germany a number of organizations with interminable names and equally interminable enterprise and funds: The Imperial Consultative Board for the Elaboration of Commercial Measures, for example. The German Consular Service has advised the merchant at all times. The government has issued tons of literature for his instruction and profit. The railways have been caused to assist him, and the banks as well. The amount of official care taken in this matter is astonishing in its magnitude. All this is immensely costly — too costly for any other agency than the state — but it has seemed to prove itself worth the price.

More than this, the government, meaning Bismarck, a most skillful observer of the mores, was converted, along in the early eighties, to the creation of a colonial empire. It promptly seized three large areas and one small one in Africa; a section of New Guinea and the adjacent Melanesian archipelago, re-named "Bismarck-Archipel";

a section of a province in China; and certain small islands in the Pacific.[1] The representations of German merchants, and their plea for protection and for areas of trade-expansion, were largely responsible for this movement. This colonial empire, as I have elsewhere remarked, was a veritable seizure from under the very paws of the British lion. The German Commissioner beat the British agent to Togo, the Cameroons, and Southwest Africa by hours, and the Melanesian holdings were taken in the face of British and Australian intentions of occupation. The Chinese station was exacted, under a ninety-nine year "lease," in consequence of the murder of certain German missionaries; and the current feeling as to the transaction found expression in the soliloquy attributed to the Kaiser by a comic paper: "If my missionaries only hold out, I shall soon own the earth." East Africa was acquired by the efforts of three young adventurers who, sailing under assumed names and disguised as laborers, but with the support of the Society for German Colonization, cajoled a bundle of treaties, imperfectly if at all understood, out of native chiefs.

It was felt at the time that these proceedings

[1] The story of German colonization is rehearsed in some detail in Keller, "Colonization."

partook of the cavalier in nature, but the British statesmen were too dazed, under the bullying abruptness of Bismarck, to make objection. Such forceful methods had not been in use hitherto, for the German sense of power had emerged but recently; but they were passed over, and even somewhat admired. The important fact that issues from these details is that Germany went at the commercial and industrial competition in a highly organized and systematic way; and that it was, openly or covertly, the State that headed most of the projects and saw them through. The British system, or lack of system, had been of a far less organized and artificial and more of a "natural" type. But this new sort of thing, while it was regarded as characteristic of German manners and lack of amenity, aroused no special opposition or even misgiving.

Later on, however, certain statesmen became convinced that Germany was looking for trouble. The Kaiser's visit to the Holy Land, his proclamation of himself as protector of Islam, the incident of Manila Bay, the Moroccan difficulties, and other events of like color and betraying a certain attitude of mind, came to be cited as indicative of a threat and a menace. The diplomats conceived a growing distaste for the behavior of German agents

around the international conference-table. All these things could not be set down forthwith to the account of Teutonic boorishness; there was calculation behind them, and a policy that included an overbearing belligerency and a frequent laying of the fist upon the saber-hilt. But the apprehensions of the diplomats received no support in public opinion and there were comparatively few who were not surprised when they turned out to have a very real basis.

The unusual and offensive conduct of the Germans in their international relations is now seen to have been the inevitable reflection of their national code. The Prussian, said Goethe, a century ago, is a brute, and when he becomes civilized, he will be ferocious. But now, shortly after the middle of the last century, there occurred a precipitation of the German national solution under the master-agitation of a powerful adherent of autocracy, and the dominant tinge of the final combination was Prussian. It has so remained. With relentless efficiency the appropriate mores have been suggested, transmitted, and inculcated in an apt human material. The Imperial State was constructed as a pedestal of iron, blood-bathed, for the support of a ruler autocratic in his divine right. The whole complex of mores

became more and more militaristic, the ostensible excuse for that retrograde tendency being the central position of the Fatherland, menaced on all sides by its "iron ring" of enemies.

This code seemed to be succeeding well and became the prosperity-policy of the nation. Few cared or dared to question or criticize it. Then, coinciding with the natural self-assertive tendency of a newly unified people, the conviction as to its efficacy developed into a blind faith in its supreme potency, and, at length, into a degree of ethnocentrism unparalleled among intelligent races. And finally arose the dogma of its world-mission — to disseminate the *echt deutsche Kultur* to the benighted or decadent nations. Thus developed a doctrine.

"If you want war," writes Sumner,[1] "nourish a doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject, because doctrines get inside of a man's own reason and betray him against himself. Civilized men have done their fiercest fighting for doctrines. The reconquest of the Holy Sepulcher, 'the balance of power,' 'no universal dominion,' 'trade follows the flag,' 'he who holds the land will hold the sea,' 'the throne and the altar,' the revolution, the faith —

[1] "War and Other Essays," pp. 36, 37, 38.

these are the things for which men have given their lives. . . . Think what an abomination in statecraft an abstract doctrine must be. Any politician or editor can, at any moment, put a new extension on it. The people acquiesce in the doctrine and applaud it, because they hear the politicians and editors repeat it, and the politicians and editors repeat it because they think it is popular. So it grows."

I hardly need to go into this matter further. He who runs may read the outcome of the German doctrine. It has led Germany to hate and envy her even partially successful peaceful rivals, and to risk all the substantial meat she had by snapping at the reflection in the water. She wanted, not her legitimate share under the rules of peaceful competition, but all. The only way to get all was to break the rules. Well, she was ready, in her state of mores, for even that.

The contemporary disposition and code of the Germans have been vigorously summed up by Burroughs.[1] He cites a number of their unspeakable atrocities; protests rightly against the shallow sophistication that says: "Never mind; let it all pass; business is business, and it will all

[1] "Can Peace Make Us Forget?" A Plea for the Ostracism of all Things German, in the *New York Tribune* for December 14, 1917.

be the same in a hundred years;" and writes of German ideas as follows. I have seen no better condensed summary.

"We do not want their ideas or their methods. Their ideas are subversive of our democratic ideals, and their methods enslave the mind and lead to efficiency chiefly in the field of organized robbery. They are efficient as Krupp guns and asphyxiating gas and liquid fire are efficient. They invent nothing, but they add a Satanic touch to the inventions of others and turn them to infernal uses. They are without sentiment or imagination. They have broken completely with the old Germany of Goethe, of Kant and Lessing, to whom we all owe a debt. They are learned in the roots of things, but their learning is dusty and musty with underground conditions. They know the 'Tree of Knowledge' at the bottom, but not at the top in the air and sun, where are its leaves and flowers and fruit. They run to erudition, but not to inspiration. They are a heavy, materialistic, grasping race, forceful but not creative, military but not humanistic, aggressive but not heroic, religious but not spiritual; brave it may be, but not chivalrous, utterly selfish, thoroughly scientific and efficient on a low plane, as organized force is always efficient.

"From current reports which, knowing the Germans, one readily credits, they are at this moment taking means to increase their birth rate by methods identical with those of stock men and dog breeders. That the German women do not defend themselves with liquid fire and asphyxiating gas shows that their morals are as low as those of the men and that they are the victims of the same civic slavery.

"The Germans have not fought this war like brave, chivalrous men; they have fought it like sneaks and cutthroats; they have respected nothing human or divine. So far as they could make it so it has been an orgy of lust and destructiveness. When their armies are forced to retreat, so far as they can do it, they destroy the very earth behind them. They have done their utmost to make the reconquered territory of Northern France uninhabitable for generations. If they could poison all the water, all the air, all the food of their enemies, is there any doubt that they would quickly do so? If they could have scuttled or torpedoed the British Isles and sunk them like a ship, would they not have done it long ago? Of course they would have wanted to plunder the treasures and violate the women before doing so, and then the Kaiser, piously lifting his

eyes before his people, would have again thanked God for His 'faithful coöperation,' and again would have prated how he would continue to carry on the war with 'humility and chivalry.'"

An arrogant, grasping, and cruel winner; a poor loser, cherishing a malignant envy toward rivals — in short, a poor player of the game, ready to break it up to secure an advantage. That is what the German code has made of the German. No wonder that the peaceful international competition was broken up by him; for it demands the same good sportsmanship to play that tremendous game aright as to engage in any other social undertaking involving competition. No wonder the German code has developed into a momentous challenge to the code of modern civilization.

XI. THE CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CODE

Because my chief interest is selection by war, I have felt it necessary to consider rather carefully the constitution of the peace-group, and of those accompanying adaptations which allow of the peaceful settlement of issues, that is, of peaceful conflict and selection. For war-selection has issued in these structures for peace, and can be understood only as one realizes that it has been succeeded by them, and is now resorted to that they may become the more secure. Through war to peace. For war is a temporary thing, and we shall presently return to peace and its methods — but not before a selection has been wrought at the hand of war which nothing else but war can bring to pass, and whose completion must not be stayed unless it is desirable to have war invoked again. The issue of the present is too big for any methods of peaceful settlement ever developed by the race.

In this age, with the mores of civilization always stressing toward peace, a world-conflict such as

the present one cannot arise unless there is a vital issue, an issue over the essentials of civilization. To recur yet once again to the smaller peace-group: here the essentials are in the national code and are accepted by nearly all as axiomatic. But suppose these essentials are challenged. Then, while the minor cases of divergent interests are composed by peaceful competition, under the general code, and upon it as a sort of touchstone, the essentials cannot be so settled. For there can be no reference to a wider peaceful authority over the challenging mores than the challenged code itself. It takes revolution and civil war to bring about the composition of an issue as to the code itself. I refer again to the case of slavery in this country. The lesser challenges to details of the national code have been settled with little and local violence; but when the peace-group could not continue to exist half one thing and half the other — without, that is, a clean-cut and profound selection — the violence has been enormous and nation-wide.

Similarly in the case of the more comprehensive peace-group. There is now a Great War, enlisting nearly the whole of civilization, because there was a challenge to the essentials of the code of the civilized world. Frantic efforts to localize the

conflict have been of no avail because the challenge was directed unmistakably at the very heart of the code by which the civilized peoples had been living.

It is true that the sweeping nature of the challenge was not clear from the outset. It came, in fact, unexpectedly to most of the concourse of nations, and the gathering revelations of its character remained for some time incredible. Only gradually did the basic issue disengage itself from non-essentials and stand forth stark and bare before the unbelievers. There is no object in recording in this place the successive stages of growing illumination and disillusion. The whole conflict has resolved itself into as pure a conflict of codes, joined on the grandest scale, as any the world ever saw on the smaller scale; and the selection is bound to be, now or later, as decisive on the grandest scale as any ever witnessed on the smaller. The civilized world cannot continue to exist half one thing and half the other. Unless we are to turn back on the course of societal evolution, which is unthinkable in the absence of a summoning change in life-conditions, this challenge will be repelled and annihilated. It will certainly be so repelled, now or later, by the unhurried action of the elemental forces that are be-

hind all societal evolution; but we can save part of the cost of the process, paid in human suffering, by understanding and working with those forces.

Let us look into the nature of the challenge, as at length revealed in the event. Perhaps the central article of all, and the one upon which the President has unerringly fastened, is the flouting of international engagements and covenants. This strikes at the only formulation of the international code ever attained, and at the only guaranteeing power behind agreements, which is national honor. No civilized nation has openly and deliberately assaulted those fundamentals before, and with a counter-system in mind. Evidently, however, the German intention is to displace them in favor of something else, namely, national necessity backed by highly organized force. But this, of course, would reduce the international peace-group to the violent chaos of aforetime, out of which it has slowly and painfully emerged at the cost of endless human woe. It is a negation of the very beginnings of law, and is equivalent to the theory that any individual may take the law into his own hands if he needs to and is strong enough to defy its sponsors. One or the other of these theories must prevail; they cannot go on side by side.

Implicit in this item of challenge is the intention of bending all other interests to German interests, and by violence or the threat of such. Consider the "will-to-power" of a self-styled supreme nation. But this idea is utterly inconsonant with the international code, in so far as it has developed. That code contemplates an equality of nations in their dealings with one another. Its contention is on the order of "Live and Let Live." To the Germans the small and weak nations — weak because small — have no reason for or right to independent existence. The international code, voiced again by the President, holds the opposite view. Here again is a contrast admitting of no compromise. It is no less a question than of how the world is to be run; and there is no doubt, now that the issue has been bared, about the world's opinion on that score.

Challenge is thrown down, further, to the spirit of amity between nations upon a friendly footing; it is proposed, evidently, to return to suspicion, treachery, and hypocrisy; to cast aside the ancient mores of guestfriendship and to betray and use hospitality for all it is worth to the guest. No longer are we to trust the honor of a nation as signalized in the honorable conduct of its official representatives. This proposition strikes at the

only settled method of composing peaceably the divergent interests of nations. If every ambassador were a Bernstorff, a Luxburg, or a Dumba, of what possible utility for a peace-group could the whole system of representation of foreign interests be? Accredited representatives must all be honest and of goodwill, or they must all be regarded as enemies within our lines. The German and Austrian ambassadors have been spies upon friends, relying upon virtues and kindliness in others in order to do them treacherous damage with impunity. There is no possibility of compromise with this new theory of diplomatic relations. Duplicity or honesty — not half one thing and half the other.

The challenge is, as we see, one involving the whole theory of the international peace-group. Germany will none of it. A whole treatise could be written around this contention. The issue at its broadest is whether civilization is to go on developing the international peace-group or to go over to the substitute set of variations fathered by Germany, and now thrust forward with power. There has to be a selection here; and there never was any power short of the most strenuous selective factor ever developed, namely, war, that has any remote chance of effecting the

selection. Not a few minor items, but all the major essentials of the international code are involved in the challenge. No more clear-cut issue was ever presented to human society for selection.

But let us go on with other items of challenge to the code of civilization, not involving, perhaps, so direct an assault upon the existence of the peace-group, but seeking to abrogate the very mores of humanity and human pity which naked savages were already in primitive times respecting. For long ages, as I have shown, the methods of warfare have been rendered less harsh and bestial by the spontaneous development of chivalry and humanity. There are always in war certain loosenings of the codes of individuals; the baser sort are freed from restraints, in their relations with members of the "out-group," which they have perforce observed in those with fellow group-members. But even between nations at war certain taboos have been honored, at least in form and officially, which prohibited the most ruthless conduct. These the Germans have challenged, both informally and officially, cynically remarking that "*Krieg ist Krieg.*" The world is too sophisticated to be impressed with war-paint and scalps, but it was thought that it could be cowed by a

more elaborate, systematic, and inhuman *Schrecklichkeit.*

It is a libel on the Hun to use his face and figure to symbolize the German. For a long time no right-minded man could believe that such things could be, or ever had been; but he can doubt no longer. This is no gentleman's war; it is not a war against civilized people, for the code is the mark of civilization and the German code is beneath that of the Sioux in their bloodiest days. Is it needful to go into detail? Let the reader examine the reports of the Bryce and other commissions and reflect upon that evidence. In the most primitive days any means of killing the enemy would do; well, any of them will do for the German, and he has a much larger choice of inhuman devices. He is without chivalry for the enemy, on the field or captive. Toward the noncombatant and neutral he is more ferocious than Attila, even with his dimmer lights, ever was. Toward the old, the helpless, and the children he is a raving beast; and toward defenseless women an incarnation of lust that no adjective, even those coined by writers on Turk and Tartar, can portray. It is wrong to call that lust brutal, for brutes never use their females in such manner; and it is an injustice to the most primitive man

to call such calculated conduct barbarous or savage. It wants a parallel on earth.

All this is part of the official program of frightfulness; but the ultimate purpose is a popular one, or there would be protest, disobedience, or revolt. Fancy official orders to misuse women given to American soldiers; to an army whose penalty for rape is death. Yet the German soldiers have carried out the orders with gusto; they did not rebuke, nor were they rebuked. It is from the German nation, not from a few of its rulers, that this challenge to humanity derives; and the nation thus betrays itself as essentially uncivilized. Its assault upon civilization must be repelled as former assaults have been, if the code that includes what we most prize is to live on. The world cannot go on half-humane and half Vandal. *Schrecklichkeit* and humanity do not mix. The latter awaits its deliverance—its Tours and its Martel.

It is, in a sense, immaterial where this German variation on the world-code came from, except that it is not to be referred to individual, purposeful action. The situation, finally revealed, is the challenge of the loathsome thing, and the fact that the challenge has been at length realized and taken up by civilization. The process of

selection is on, in its strongest and final form. There is no further appeal for us if war does not bring a decision. The issue is the gravest that has ever confronted human society, and the selective agency is present in a power never before imagined. We face, indeed, a critical episode in societal evolution. And the apprehension of the issues involved has led to an alignment of world-opinion on a scale unparalleled in history.

XII. THE FORMATION OF A WORLD-OPINION

The striking reversal of the world's opinion about Germany is one of the outstanding phenomena of the war. Nearly a score of nations have declared war on her, and a number of others have broken off relations. Openly on her side stand her three vassals — how willingly we cannot surely say. No other nation has ever seen the public opinion of the world so massed against it.

A thing of this sort does not happen without reason. But the significant fact about this mobilization of public opinion is the spontaneity of its response. The planning and the propaganda, along with the rest of the preparedness, were aimed in another direction. The masses of civilized nations did not figure out the broad issue, and have not yet done so; but they resented the exhibitions of malevolence and feared for their own interests. They went through no "Pentecost of Calamity," but they came to know what was being done in the way of murder, robbery,

violation, and desecration, and it shocked them. They knew, at length, what women and children had to expect from the German, and the moral gorge rose within them. To many came an accession of cold and relentless rage as they saw in the mind's eye their own wives and daughters at the mercy of the apostles of *Kultur*, and their young children mangled or turned out to wander alone and helpless through a ruined land. With a "larger selfishness" they rallied to the defense of the code of humanity.

It took overt acts — conditions and not theories — to bring them to this; and even then there was an interval, in the remoter countries, before incredulity gave way. It is significant of much that German public opinion needed no such interval of accommodation; it was not in a condition to be shocked or temporarily paralyzed by surprise. But the masses in other nations were not prepared. They could not have known of the great Goethe's scathing indictment of the Prussian. They could not sense the irritation of John Hay at Prussian "jackbootism." They knew nothing of German atrocities in the colonies, in apology for which even German officialdom adopted the term *Tropenkoller*, or madness of the tropics. They were not in the way of hearing of Treitschke

or *Der Tag*. They regarded the saber-rattling as an amusing piece of boorishness, and the "shining armor" as the theatrical posturing of an imperial gallery-player. They goodnaturedly accepted the explanation that "war-lord" was a mistranslation of a perfectly innocuous term, and they even applauded, a few years ago, the Kaiser's pious reminder, on the occasion of his quarter-centenary as ruler, that peace, not war, had been near his heart. True; there had been no war. There is always peace till there is not. They smiled at the old man's dreams — good old Bobs, who, in his eagerness lest the common weal take harm, saw specters in broad daylight — and at the young man's visions.

But the overt acts came, and there was no denying them; and there was found no appeal against them save to the sword. Others were tried faithfully enough, and patience was stretched to the breaking-point. Time was lost, it may be, by our own long effort to restore the peace-group by peaceful means; but the ultimate failure of that effort was more convincing to us and to the world than anything else could have been. It settled the fact that the essence of the international code had been deliberately challenged, and that war was the only possible arbitrament,

for it was the only argument that the challenger could understand. If our protracted patience, and our repeated and reiterated reference to the essentials of the code, to honor and humanity, had not availed, certainly no other and weaker nation could hope to convert and persuade by its representations. The President's repeated notes not only revealed that Germany was challenging the essentials of civilization, but they formulated, as it had not before been formulated, the code that was in peril. It stood forth, in the President's hands, as something eminently desirable and indispensable. The vague conceptions of simpler minds were crystallized into definite form, for the exposition of the essentials of international behavior was done with the same sort of simple clarity that Lincoln was master of. And it was not alone the simpler minds that were clarified — was it not Lincoln, again, who said that if a proposition was stated clearly enough for the simple to understand, the wise had no excuse for not understanding? In any case, the sentiment arose that, while there was an approved way for human beings and nations to live and act, Germany would have none of it, and meant to replace the traditional code by another of which she was making a repulsive exhibition. The

alternative was to renounce the old code or fight; and the decision of civilization was for the latter. Even the Allies, already in the field, saw better now what they were fighting for, and took heart when they knew that the rest of civilization was with them.

Evidently the former international peace-group has broken down. There are now two peace-groups, of two different varieties, fighting one another. The initial advantage was all on the challenging side, for, in addition to its status of readiness, its organization was better fitted for the exercise of violence. Apart from the pity of it, there was a question about the ability of essentially peaceful, industrial societies to go back and succeed in violent conflict, to which they had become disaccustomed, against an enemy that was never out of practice. It was and has remained a question whether a group of free and independent democracies could attain to the integration of a group whose whole control lay in a single dominant body. It was a question of becoming proficient, against the will, in a cruder form of conflict than the one to whose conditions adjustment had been made. The antagonist had selected his own weapons, method of combat, and time; he had to be faced on his

own selected ground. It has been a grand test of adaptability for the industrial nations.

But the spirit of civilization has risen to meet the crisis. Here is something, however repugnant, that has to be done. Fire has to be fought with fire. It will be done, and done to the Queen's taste. It will be seen through to the end. Only, Never Again! This seems to be the mood of the defenders of civilization. It is in contrast with that of the assaulters who already look forward to the "next war"; for, in their code, war is, in and of itself, a good thing. So far are they removed from the consensus of civilization. But the contemptible decadent who did not worship "Gott" — *unsern alten Gott* — has, despite desperate initial handicaps, frustrated the deep-laid designs of *Weltmacht*, and has shown that, when it is inevitable, he can play the game he does not wish to play. Swift adaptation to the militancy that they did not love has characterized the industrial nations; radical transformations of policy, as when America had recourse to the draft, have revealed an alertness in adaptation that no one suspected. Such radical means of adjustment could never have been put into operation among a free people if that people — the common people, the masses — had not sensed the

peril to civilization and the prospect of losing that which had made life on earth, especially life in America, worth living. Once sensed, the movement to repel the peril was as spontaneous as the rushing together of isolated frontiersmen to meet the menace of an Indian raid.

I have said that it took overt acts to rouse the world's public opinion. It is not yet fully roused because by many these acts are not yet visualized. There are people who are deficient in imagination — in the power of visualization. They take in only dully and vaguely that which does not enter their minds by way of direct impression upon the senses. This is particularly true if their minds have been adjusted to altogether different sorts of things. Many an Englishman saw the light when he had viewed an air-raid, and had perhaps witnessed the mutilation of children and the despair of mothers. Frightfulness did not intimidate him, but roused and infuriated him, when once he had met it face to face. Pacifists in this country would not hold out long in their fatuity if they were obliged, fast-bound, to witness the goatlike sex-orgies of the German officer and soldier, particularly if the victims were of their own household. The man with imagination visualizes these horrors that shame the sun with

tightening throat and implacable anger, and also with alarm. For there is nothing more inviolable in American young womanhood, nor more appealing in American babies, than there was in French and Belgian and Polish girlhood and childhood.

To the unimaginative in this country has come, however, a series of shocks: the submarine warfare, the malevolence and duplicity of diplomatic agents, the revelations of the Zimmermann note, the unbelievable disclosures of the spy system, the uncovering of malignant plotting of every sort. Some of these things have struck very near home — near enough to be visualized. The government has doled out authenticated items, from time to time, which seem to be but part of a larger store. Our people do not like war; they hate it. But all but the traitors and the incurably light-minded want it now — want "this one more war to kill war," as some one has well put it. And the more they shall suffer from war, and fear and hate it, the keener will they be to win this one. The opponents of war, like the one-time hyphenated Americans, are not so numerous as they are noisy. We, like the English and French, are buckling down soberly as a nation to the Augean task of cleaning out the

stables of central Europe, hoping to lay hand, at length, upon a Circe's rod that will turn the *Saumensch* into a human again.

This is not militarism. It is militancy. We have been obliged to descend to the adversary's level, so far as to take up the gage from the ground upon which it was flung; but war is no creed or "-ism" to the civilized nations now facing Germany and her henchmen. Civilized public opinion can never tolerate remaining on the German level except to fight the extension of the German code; and that is why "Never Again" means a definite decision now. If there is no decision, then we may all have to stay upon that lower level so long, and to remain militant in such an increasing and desperate degree, that we may unlearn our anti-militarism. There is danger in an approach to militarism; for it has a glamour, is seductive, and is attended by what Franklin called the "pest of glory." It is essential to the selection that the present war is effecting that we hold tight to the code of civilization while we are utterly destroying the rank growth that threatens it. It is this latter that must be *spurlos versenkt*, and quickly, too, I repeat; for if the war lasts on for years, speedily recurs, or, because no definitive decision is reached, threatens and demands a huge defensive

organization, we shall run much risk of embracing the evil against which we are now embattled.

This gathering public opinion of the world is going to make itself felt, not alone in war, but also, in ways peculiar to itself, when the war is over. To it Germany is already outside the pale of civilization; and this war means, therefore, in a very real sense, no break-up at all, but a cause of strengthening and cohesion, for the international peace-group. Turkey's past performances have never been taken to indicate anything concerning the status of the international code; she simply did not count in respect to that. And Germany ranks with Turkey, though infinitely more treacherous and dangerous. These birds of a feather are now snuggling harmoniously together on the same roost. Germany's case is that of a renegade movement against civilization by a professed member and supporter of the international peace-group, who has secretly come to sneer at its code and has observed its forms in order the more securely to assault it. Expulsion from the group is the natural result. What that will mean during and after the war we can better judge, perhaps, when we have considered more generally the function, in societal evolution, of conflict by violence.

XIII. SELECTION BY WAR

The consideration of societal selection other than by war, though it has been treated not so much for itself as for its bearing upon war-selection, has engaged us for some time; it has been protracted because of the number of aspects which it presents, and because much light is thrown upon war-selection by reflecting somewhat carefully and fully over the other and milder forms that have superseded war to such a wide extent. Peaceful selection is indeed the enlightened and evolved form upon which civilization has prided itself, and for which no excuses or disavowals ever need to be made. But now we have seen that it is too fine an instrument for the settlement of the major and essential issues, when the latter are challenged to the death. This sort of crisis calls for the primordial and elemental blood and iron. We come, then, to an examination of the methods and results of selection in the mores as effected by war.

It has been noted that a "conflict of the mores" is a figure of speech; the conflict is between the

adherents of the mores. If the adherents of one code are annihilated, selection has done its work in favor of the rival code. The simplest and most conclusive form of war-selection is therefore by annihilation. It was the primordial form, where there was no such thing as quarter. The Germans have practiced it in no small degree, and deliberately, not alone on the battle-field, but also in the prison-camp and the slave-quarters. To the legitimate methods and instruments of destruction in battle have been added gas and fire attacks and the dissemination of poison and disease. Once it was a thing to shudder at when one read of colonists leaving smallpox-infected garments where the Indians might find and use them; it was incredibly inhuman and barbarous; but now we are used to worse things and have even had to descend to them in self-defense. However, it is possible to contrast two striking expedients, the gas-apparatus, and the "tank," as significant of two divergent attitudes toward the proprieties of warfare. The former — and there might be added to this category the air-ship and submarine, as employed by Germany — represents a cruel and unusual instrumentality, while the latter is a perfectly legitimate variation on the instrumentalities recognized as allowable

in civilized warfare. And as for the prisoners and non-combatants, the condition of the captured Germans should be compared with that of captives made by the Germans, or with that of the enslaved Belgians who have been returned to their homes, at length, wrecked physically for life. It is clear enough that the Germans are not content with the toll of annihilation taken on the battlefield; they have in mind no less than annihilation of any and all who stand in their way, and especially of the smaller nations. Belgium and Serbia have been systematically annihilated, in so far as was possible.

It is characteristic of the Teutonic half-knowledge that such procedure is an outcome of acceptance of the Darwinian theory. Germans have always been strong in applying theory from one field to matters of a quite different quality in another range; it took Germans to work out in meticulous detail the analogy between a society and an organism, and finally come to identify the two. There is no need of writing a book, as Nasmyth [1] has done, to prove that Darwin countenanced no such conclusions as have been drawn in his name; even an elementary analysis reveals the fact that organic and societal evolution

[1] "Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory."

are effective each on its own plane, and according to its own mode, and not otherwise. But a swift snatch at the analogy was satisfactory to the German mind, especially since the crude conclusions were in consonance with German mores.

It remains true, however, that the most effective societal selection is secured through annihilation of one of the contending codes, through the persons of its adherents. Doubtless most of the earliest and most determinative selections in the course of societal evolution came about in this manner. They are the ones that have lasted and have laid down the lines for the subsequent development of society. But, while war always implies partial annihilation, it came, after a while, to be restricted to that. When enough antagonists had been killed to weaken the enemy's power of resistance, the rest were enslaved. Our interest in such enslavement lies only in the bearing upon selection of this alternative to annihilation. In the subjection here referred to, there is no idea of deliberately producing tuberculous human wrecks, that is, of enslaving with the purpose of annihilation at leisure; the reference is to subjection by conquest, after which masters and slaves live side by side in the same society. In such a case there ensues a selection in the mores, but by no means

the prevalence of one code, even that of the masters, in its original lines. Rather is there mutual transmission of mores and a composite product. The result is a compounding of the two classes and of their interests, and, at length, a merging of their identity. This is the way states have formed. If, however, the masters exert unremitting pressure to extend their own code over the conquered, and will none of the other, the two social strata remain in open or latent hostility, as in Alsace, and refuse to amalgamate, even under a combination of strenuous compulsion and occasional feigned complaisance.

There can be no doubt that, if Germany were to win, there would be a farther and wider exhibition of what has occurred in her conquered provinces and in her so-called colonies. And that would mean that, sooner or later, there would be another conflict. No selection can be arrived at in such manner. Every one knows that Germany despaired of Germanizing Alsace-Lorraine except by executing or banishing the former inhabitants and filling their places with Germans — that is, by annihilation; and in their tropical colonies the same insistence upon a code delivered to the chosen race by their *Gott* has resulted in almost unintermittent oppression of the natives and in

recurrent revolts that have ushered in the better understood and better beloved method of selection by direct annihilation.

But we need not analyze closely these two forms of selection, by annihilation and by subjugation and enslavement. We do not intend to use either of them. They are obvious enough, and if Germany prevails we shall have an opportunity of experiencing them in our own persons. They belong to the German mores, and are corollaries of the German code where they are not its major articles. When we are told that the Kaiser will stand no nonsense from America after the war, that is a threat of precisely the same mailed fist which has banged the council-tables of several decades, and has more recently smitten the conquered and helpless victim.

However, I feel under no constraint to believe or fear that the present war is about to issue in the survival of the German code, and so I shall confine myself to considering how the said conflict is going to eliminate that code. There is no prophecy here; the massed public opinion of the world is a guarantee that the challenge to the code of civilization will not, in the end, prevail. There is no such change in the conditions of the race's life as to call for a retrogression. There is

no possibility that societal evolution will turn back upon its course and land us again in ante-savagery. If the Germans prevail and we are thus reduced, it will be time enough then to explain how it was done. This present war-selection is here contemplated from the standpoint of civilization and its interests, with the hope of better understanding the massive process so that it may not be hindered but allowed to go on to its full fruition. Toward furthering this end we do not expect to employ either annihilation or subjugation of the German type, and so these processes and their results need not be further considered.

The Allied nations could have used these methods. That is, in theory they could have done so. In practice they could not. This disability, due to adherence to the civilized code, left them at a considerable material disadvantage. Not only could they not wantonly kill, murder, or enslave, but they also felt obliged to assist those who had been conquered and cold-bloodedly robbed by the adversary, and whom otherwise he would have enslaved or annihilated, or both. The Allies were even constrained by their code of humanity to help the enemy, or to buy him off from wholesale annihilation, by supplying Bel-

gians, Poles, Armenians, and other conquered peoples with the means for living. It has been a heavy task to fight with honorable scruple against an unscrupulous and dishonorable foe. For more than three years American ears could hardly fail to hear the derisive mirth of the Teuton as he reached out his hand to profit by the, to him, contemptible and decadent humanity of America. What would he have done? Why, the logical thing, of course. Fancy the German, if the case were reversed, assisting the enemy by feeding and clothing the population of a ravaged district. In our place he would have withheld all help from the Belgians and Armenians; then the enemy could either have spent his resources in maintaining them, or have incurred the abhorrence of the world by letting them perish. A perfectly clear case of *Realpolitik*. But self-respect demanded of the champions of civilization that, except where response in kind was clearly indicated as the sole measure of self-preservation, there should be no recourse to unsavory methods. Reprisals for air-raids have been delayed, even if they are to come at all; reprisals on German prisoners for the miseries and broken bodies and spirits of French and English captives have not taken place. Doubtless, as to the savage, so to

the German, such scruples seem merely the evidence of weakness and even cowardice — in any case of decadence. Good old *Gott* could not countenance such soft procedure and must give the victory to his own true and hardy worshipers. It constitutes a real handicap, in such a conflict, to cherish such scruples.

In general, then, the Allies are fighting in accord with their civilized code; if there is a conquest by them, there will be no annihilation or enslavement of the conquered. It is not that the adversary is not bad enough, but that "we are too good." Indeed, the cause for concern is quite other, namely, that there will be a mistaken magnanimity, a tendency to let bygones be bygones and start again, a willingness to regard the criminal as repentant and reformed, if he says he is — and then turn him loose on the world again. This, as we shall see, will mean another war just as soon as Germany has recovered; nothing could stop that except remaining armed to the teeth, and squandering the fruits of industry upon unproductive devices for destruction. Unless Germany were to renounce her code. Of course that is the essential — that that code shall be renounced. But how can that come about if there is to be no annihilation or subjection with control?

From the beginning there has been but one effective agency that has led men to change their ways: discomfort amounting to suffering and productive of disillusionment. If an individual is miserable enough, he will overhaul his mode of life; if a society suffers sufficiently, it will at length question its code. The more successful the code has been, or has seemed to be, in the past — the more inveterate the belief in it — the slower will the awakening be. The case before us is, then, a hard one; for the German people have had their code so exalted before them, both blatantly and subtly, from babyhood up, that they are incapable, even under great provocation, of criticizing it. They are apparently incurably docile, and unwilling to form or incapable of forming an independent public opinion. This means that there is no use trying to reason with them — not yet. It means that they must suffer much before they will question, let alone give up, their ways.

It is, then, the line of action for the Allies to make them suffer much, and resolutely to turn a deaf ear to their rulers' calculating proposals to end the conflict, until there shall have appeared unmistakable fruits meet for repentance. Protests are of no further avail, while the code is held;

after it is renounced, it can be reasoned about — not before. The fate of naïveté in this matter is being illustrated for us all by the Bolsheviki. There can be no compromise or reconciliation between the German code and the code we are engaged in defending, as I have sufficiently demonstrated above. The security of an international peace-group is out of the question until this challenge to the international code has been eliminated.

There is, I have said, no intention of annihilating or enslaving the German nation. To try to do that would be to lend adherence to that course of conduct which has ostracized Germany from the concourse of civilized peoples. Mere military victory, by itself, can no more than quell the present attempt upon the code of civilization. Unless that victory comes about, nothing else can be done; but if it is not followed up by alterations and adjustments of the German code by the German people, no profound and definitive selection will have taken place. Adjustment along the lines of the international code, to be effective and lasting, must come from within. Just how may war result in this inner alteration of the mores?

XIV. GERMAN FETISH-WORSHIP

ANY nation's code is its prosperity-policy, and is clung to because of the conviction that it is an expedient and a winning policy in living. The Germans think that their militarism or Prussianism is a winning policy. They have seen some of the advantages which they have gained by it; and they have been adjured, since they were able to understand anything, to remember that their undoubted prosperity was due to the militarist régime of the Hohenzollerns. That is doubtless the conviction of most Germans. "*Das kanonenfeste Deutschland*" has long been paraded before a sentimental and suggestible people, not too well endowed with a sense of the ridiculous. The "shining armor" and other stage-properties dazzle their eyes. There dangles before their minds a conception of the State as a sort of divine entity, invincible, and personified in the ruling dynasty, by whose benevolent, paternal, unerring, and resolute action they have been made the greatest of nations and the world's hope. This

has become an obsession with them and is correlative with the contempt, clumsily veiled or grossly exposed, which they feel for other nations. It renders possible the incredibly fatuous expressions of their public men, authors, and preachers. I do not need to cite illustrations of this colossal national self-satisfaction; Archer [1] and others have compiled typical specimens.

The authorities, themselves at least partially auto-hypnotized by this same grandiose vision, have worked on fertile soil. It goes without the saying that they could not have raised the crop they have raised upon other ground, say in France or England. The situation, that is, is not referable to a single individual or group of individuals, but to the automatic development of a typical national character and code. The sophisticated leaders, above all Bismarck, repeatedly took advantage, sometimes with a candid cynicism, of the ground prepared for them. The German people are fetish-worshipers, and their fetishes are the government and especially the army. The creed that forms the rallying-point for all their adulations is militarism. Their god is at best the Yahweh that incited the peoples of old to smite the rival nation hip and thigh, with-

[1] "Gems of German Thought."

out mercy, where he is not Odin or Thor of the Hammer. Though Germany has been nominally Christian, not much has been heard of the New Dispensation.

This militarist religion is the sanction of militarist mores and supports them at every turn. It too has been tested up and found, in the German view, expedient and good. Only a powerful divinity could have presided over the demonstrated prosperity of the Empire. Witness the seizure of a million square miles of colonies, with a population of ten millions, accomplished within a year and from under the very nose of astonished England. Witness the German conquest of the world-market, engineered by astute state paternalism. Witness the flocking of the nations to Germany in quest of knowledge and science at their source. It was without a sense of inconsistency that all German literature, art, and music were referred to the same great fetish: Goethe and Beethoven, they too were children of the war-god and exponents of the absurd "will-to-power" — discrepancies of an historical and biographical nature being irrelevant and negligible in the face of so blinding a revelation of national superhuman superiority. Why should a nation not believe utterly in a code, or a prosperity-policy, that

could produce all this and more? There were plenty of local magi who could prove indisputably what they all wanted to believe. Nowhere else has the truth of the saying that the *raison d'être* of the human mind consists in the fact that it can always find good and sufficient reason for doing what its possessor wants to do, received more triumphant vindication than in Germany.

No wonder the German felt aggrieved, contemptuous, and at length enraged, because he was not understood by other nations. With a divine compassion Eucken writes: "Our German Kultur has, in its unique depth, something shrinking and severe; it does not obtrude itself, or readily yield itself up; it must be earnestly sought after and lovingly assimilated from within. This love was lacking in our neighbors; wherefore they easily came to look upon us with the eyes of hatred." You must first accept the German code blindly and then you come, as one of the faithful, to comprehend its serene beauty. So might a paranoiac remark to a sane man who could not share his illusions, but was somewhat uneasy on the matter of personal safety in their presence. This is precisely the way fanatics always talk about their religions: believe first; don't think, weigh, and reflect. This revelation

may seem to be contrary to knowledge and sense; it is really not contrary to these, but above them. This is the time-honored "doctrine of mystery."

Now this simple and childlike faith is what sanctions any and all departments of the German mores. By it the national code is transformed into a revelation. The mores, by themselves, can make anything right or wrong; and a supernatural sanction can add to these attributes so as to make anything also holy or sacrilegious. Thus a holy joy may attend upon the sinking of a Lusitania; and a fanatical *Hassgesang* and a *Gott strafe!* may be launched at a nation whose action, however motived, crosses the German will in the form of an impiety sure to be divinely punished. It is all very ridiculous and even imbecile in its preposterous solemnity; no wonder Tommy causes Fritz to intone the Hymn of Hate, and joins uproariously in the chorus. Such a show has never been dreamt of before and will not come soon again. It confirms all the impressions derived from Punch and elsewhere, which the Germans have so deeply resented, as to Teutonic outlandishness.

But now it is characteristic of a godlet like him of the Germans that he invariably "makes good." He has to, for there is, in his portentous solemnity,

no room for weakness or fallings-short. We gentile and un-chosen peoples can make allowances for our pet fetishes, such as the "people," and even joke at them a little, for we do not take them with such owl-like seriousness. Lèse-majesté has never bothered us very much. We have no divinely anointed One who is vulnerable and even sensitive to criticism, and who issues pronunciamentos, out of questionable inspiration, on religion, art, music, and all the rest. Also we have no statesmen, or even theologians, who will meekly recant in the face of a revelation vouchsafed by the mouth of authority. We have here no super-men, officially in the confidence of the Deity. One of us is just as likely to get a revelation as another. We could laugh appreciatively at an "*Ich und Gott*" poem, even if it were written in derision of our pet statesman. No, we are not reverent in the Teutonic way. It is no wonder that our comprehension of *Kultur* leaves much to be desired.

But, as I said, the German fetish must make good. He always does, even if it takes a special revelation to interpret some of his doings as success. He inspires to Hindenburg victories, after securing treason in the enemy's War Office, not reporting that the adversaries had only crow-bars

to fight with. And then he breathes into the spirit-receptive mind of the generalissimo the master-conception of a victorious retreat. He is a curious conducting medium for information from the outside world; for out there too the will-to-power is never balked. England is already starved out; the American soldiers cannot get across the ocean; presently the Sioux Indians will take New York — what is Mr. Dooley doing with his opportunities these days? If one marvels that a trustful and devout people can be so taken in, let him reflect upon the skill with which the rest of the world, and even of the suspicious and hostile world, has been overreached. The German system has made pretty good, so far as actual accomplishment goes, even in the eyes of those who would like to discredit it; this is ruefully admitted, although there is no desire to emulate its methods. What must it not enjoy of reputation amidst a worshipful people to whom it is uniformly and overwhelmingly successful and who are not critical of its methods or its reports?

Is a people so worshipful, and at the same time so sure of the divine potency of its leadership, going to revolt with no provocation? Not much. Is the dusky beneficiary going to throw over his old Mumbo Jumbo while the going is good and

while the priest stands by to explain any apparent lapses, or even, by some wily hocus-pocus, to lend to real misfortune the appearance of divine beneficence? What is a little suffering, with such prospects, such ends, and such a world-mission in plain view? The grumblers or critics are sacrilegious; they can be ignored or jailed. All great world-reforms demand sacrifice and steadiness of faith. The devotion of the German people to an unworthy and a losing cause is truly pathetic, but there is no doubt about its uninformed sincerity. This national devotion was grossly underestimated at first; there has been the same sort of disillusionment in this matter as there was concerning the essentially kindly and humane character of the people. Some of us hoped for a protest of the people against the atrocities of the army and navy, but there was, rather, a rejoicing among them and a pious satisfaction as of the saved viewing from the crystal battlements the lot of the damned. So that, although the reform of German ways must come from within, we have ceased to expect it so soon. As long as the present governmental system and methods are in operation, it is hardly possible to get the plain facts known by Germans, let alone interpreted from an unbiased and non-fantastic point of view.

The avenues, temporal and spiritual, for the transmission of other mores are closed.

There is no present utility (though there may be a prospective one) in telling a fanatical people that we are not fighting them, but their prepossession and religion. Fancy announcing to a Mohammedan that we are not contending against him, but against the Prophet and all his works. So long as the Germans fervently believe in their fetish, they will hug it to them the more closely, especially if it begins to whine or bluster about the impiety of those who would put asunder what "our good old God" had joined irrevocably together. There is not much use to rain down facts and tracts out of aëroplanes; they are "English lies." The case of the Germans is a refractory one and will not yield to such milder means any more than it did, preceding war, to diplomatic representations and concessions. Then, they thought, the Day of vindication was at hand; now that Day is here; and there is as yet no serious doubt that it will bring what was promised for it. How foolish to falter when success is right at hand!

It is probable that the sufferings of some of Germany's vassals have not been sanctified unto them as part of a grandiose vindication of the

fetish. M. André Chéradame [1] thinks that at least sections of the nations which Germany has "burglarized," under the guise of alliance, are ripe for a change of heart, and argues for an attempt to enlighten them as to the issues at stake — at stake not only for the world, but for themselves as well. He thinks that the projected Pan-Germany may thus explode from within. His ideas seem reasonable, for the insulating effect of the German obsession does not seem to have reached to the Czechs and other Slavic and otherwise alien races of the Dual Empire. Their severe sufferings and misgivings are not interpretable by the faith, as sacrifices to a cause, and a little propaganda might do much. It might, thinks this writer, pave the way for a decisive German defeat. Therein lies its promise; for there is no way out of this crucible of selection except through that eventuality.

[1] "How to Destroy Pan-Germany," in the *Atlantic Monthly* for December, 1917.

XV. THE ONE WAY TO UPSET THE FETISH

The Germans will endure pain and sacrifice without losing their patience or docility, so long as they are not disillusioned. I have said that their godlet has made good — or that they are convinced that he has, which amounts to the same thing. But suppose he fails so egregiously that there is no concealment or interpretation of the fact possible, and no method adequate to demonstrate that he has, after all, won out, or will certainly do so. Suppose that strategic and victorious retreats bring the ark back into Germany itself. Suppose that the army is actually, and undeniably, and even admittedly defeated, and the government overthrown. Suppose the loot of Belgium and the other conquests has to be assembled and restored, and the wantonness of destruction paid for. And suppose, along with such happenings, the German people finally learn the unadorned truth: that England is not starved out, that American soldiers are really in Europe, and so on — and above all the truth as to how the world's opinion stands regarding them. Suppose that they learn that, in-

stead of being admired, envied, and feared, they are the objects of contempt, loathing, and bitter resentment.

Here would be wholesale disillusionment. And here would be, in addition to the former sufferings — then sanctified and offered on the altar, now, in retrospect, bearing a different semblance — forebodings of another and more racking torture, that of living by tolerance in a world empty of friends. Once it was England and America that were to write off all the conqueror's obligations; now it is the conquered who must pay their own, and indemnity besides. No people has ever viewed a more waste and dreary future than will the Germans on the morrow of defeat. On all sides people who have lost by their action property, comfort, peace of mind, their dearest ones — not to mention those who have been actually oppressed and enslaved and whose life-treasures have been preyed upon by the orgy of murderousness and lust. All about them peoples who make no account of their word of honor and who have come to regard "German" as synonymous with all that is dishonorable, treacherous, and beastly.

Many people do not wish their children to study the German language, and there is already a movement on foot to exclude it from the public schools

of this country. There is more than a suspicion that hospitality to the language, in the past, has been treacherously abused, to sow discord within the nation; and that not alone through the German press, but also through the school-books, with their everlasting laudation of the German fetish. In fact, whether or not the character of text-books in German has been deliberately manipulated — and it is not at all unbelievable, in the light of what we have come to know — the prevailing fetish-worship cannot but come out in such publications. It comes out, sad to say, even when the authors are not Germans. To one who hates what Germany stands for, it is revolting to see the pictures and read the legends that are characteristic of German primers; for they reek of the unclean thing. This revulsion goes even farther. A man has admired and loved German literature of the earlier and cleaner period, and in particular, let us say, Goethe's master-work. He knows Goethe's attitude to be Prussian in no respect.[1] He recalls that Goethe could not write

[1] In a conversation with Eckermann, in March, 1828, Goethe deplores the repression of the German youth, contrasting the system that makes them "prematurely tame" with the English "Glück der persönlichen Freiheit." The conversation is too long to be reproduced here, but I cannot refrain from giving one extract.

"Es darf kein Bube mit der Peitsche knallen, oder singen, oder

war-songs, much less Hymns of Hate, because he could not hate his spiritual benefactors. And yet this man cannot now read Faust and the rest without offense. *Schrecklich,* let us say, occurs on this page, and what is the image it summons up? Here is a scene of peasant *Gemütlichkeit,* and one recalls that he derived his original impression, now shattered, from such sources. The lusts of *Walpurgisnacht*—have they not come to earth? The very words are offensive now — for how long, one cannot say. May this soon pass! But were the poet's lines not prophetic?

"Weh! Weh!
Du hast sie zerstört,
Die schöne Welt,
Mit mächtiger Faust;
Sie stürzt, sie zerfällt!
Ein Halbgott hat sie zerschlagen!
Wir tragen
Die Trümmern ins Nichts hinüber
Und klagen
Ueber die verlorne Schöne."

rufen, sogleich ist die Polizei da, es ihm zu verbieten. Es geht bei uns alles dahin, die liebe Jugend frühzeitig zahm zu machen und alle Natur, alle Originalität und alle Wildheit auszutreiben, sodass am Ende nichts übrigbleibt als der Philister."

Even in trade there will be an attitude different from the generous one encountered by Germans while yet they were profiting so successfully in the peaceful competition, enjoying the reality of the "free seas" for which they have lately clamored, and the host of other advantages accorded by an enlightened world to a respected and efficient competitor. Now it is seen that Germany is not, in any sense of the term, a "good sport," and still less a good loser; for, while succeeding notably, she was willing to break the rules of the game and make a gross assault upon any and all competitors that were succeeding in any degree. It is the old and obsolete ideal of world-monopoly that has animated her. But now some of Germany's enemies have learned, under necessity, to supply for themselves needs that only Germany could formerly meet; they do not need Germany any more. Among other disservices that she has wrought to the world, Germany has apparently demonstrated the necessity of national economic self-sufficiency, and so has contributed to put off the day when artificial barriers to freedom of trade will be a thing of the past. This is a part of the damage done to civilization which is not often mentioned, but it is a very real one. Some of her fellow-nations will not need Germany, I have said; and there will be

others which do not want her, because they have learned to suspect and dislike her. Who does business gladly with even a reformed pirate?

It is said that Germany must be powerless or free — meaning, as we take it here, free, first of all, of her obsession. It is the contention here that if she is rendered powerless by being conquered, she will become free; but that she has little or no chance of becoming free until she is decisively defeated. The obsession with the fetish acts as a sort of shell or insulation for the mores, rendering them inaccessible to outside influences and thus impairing their power of adaptation to conditions which they do not sense. The mores are thus not sensitive to environment; they are stunted in the matter of variation, and the wholesome action of selection is impaired. They are in a condition designated by zoölogists as "spinescence." The first need, for better adjustment, is to strip off the insulation, thus invading the isolation; and to open before the mores a real, in place of an imaginary or constructed environment. This can be done only by the defeat of the supposedly invincible armies and the demonstration that militarism is not the master-key to the national and international destiny. It is when Mumbo Jumbo fails to make good that they take him out and beat

him, or even pitch him into the river. A peace without victory could be too variously and ingeniously interpreted by interested parties; it would mean the persistence of the obsession and its further manifestations of uncivilized conduct in international affairs. It would mean at least uneasiness in the world for decades to come.

There are those who cry out against such a conclusion, asserting that force never settles anything; that war is uniformly bad and has never brought about good results. People who really believe this are as impervious to reason and fact as the Germans themselves; only a demonstration in which they personally figure can enlighten them. But there are others who thoughtlessly repeat such foolish assertions; and perhaps they are worth spending words upon. Such assertions represent sentimentality, not sense. War is like all the rest of human things: not all good, nor yet all bad, but mixed. It has done much in the past that nothing else could have accomplished; it is now performing before us a selection not otherwise to be hoped for. I do not care to argue an obvious case, and so leave the generalities about the good and evil of war with these few remarks and the implications of my general argument. But as to force never accomplishing anything, that too is

the nonsense of a fanatical utterance. Force has underlain all of the institutions upon which civilization has most prided itself: the family, law, government, rights, morals, and religion. How was the decision gotten over piracy, or slavery, or any other outworn practice that by its persistence constituted a menace to civilization? By arguing and passing a resolution? By tearful expostulation, or even by prayer? How did we get our national independence and start the infection of modern democracy? By moral suasion? It takes a conflict to secure selection and the survival of the fit, I repeat, in the societal range as in the organic; and the more vital the issue, the surer it is that that conflict will come down to the ultimate, violent, physical form. If one wants to maintain that an issue must be settled by appeal to reason, then the answer is that both parties must see reason. There is no argument in the presence of homicidal mania except that of force and the strait-jacket. It is a pity that this is so, but it is no less so because it is a pity. So is it a pity that a baby, leaning too far out of a window, will fall to its death; but shall we pass a resolution against gravitation? It is a pity, but yet it is a fact, that some people, especially if obsessed, will not see reason any more than an excited and overwrought

child will, until the exuberance of their unreason is reduced by punishment. The strained nerves are discharged. Then they are fit to be reasoned with, and not before. It is then that they become capable of seeing the light.

England saw the light, not from Burke's expostulations but after her war with us, and has developed an astonishing capacity, out of the maladroitness of the "colonial system" for ruling peoples. The South saw the light, after the Civil War, and would no more go back to slavery now than would the North. The Boers have seen the light. The days of the Oom Pauls are over. No grander conception of the mission and destiny of the British Empire as an enlightened peace-group was ever voiced than that of a former Boer commander and man of vision,[1] now one of the bulwarks of that Empire's Council.

And here before us is an issue, which, as I have remarked, dwarfs into insignificance any other that the race has met. There has been no lack of attempts to settle it by way of peaceful means, and they have one and all failed. It has come down to a matter of force, of killing, and of misery-making, and it must issue in decisive military defeat for the Germans if there is to be peace in the

[1] J. C. Smuts, "The British Commonwealth of Nations."

world and an extension of international relations of amity. All those who hate force and war can help to eliminate them, and also to shorten present suffering, by putting all their powers into the effort to reach the decision at the earliest possible moment.

It is not a question of annihilating or enslaving Germany, as she would like to do to the rest of us. She expects that, doubtless, judging us by herself. It is a question of eradicating her fetish-worship by demonstrating that her idols have feet of clay. Nothing but defeat of the invincible army and government, and the consequent letting-in of light as to the world's opinion of her course can do that. If this is accomplished, she can make her own selection, by revolution or otherwise. This is a tremendous task, but there is no other way of getting the results. The German government has been prodigal of promises, concealments, and lies to cover partial failures. The people have trusted it implicitly. After defeat there will be no more opportunity to conceal or deceive, and the past, present, and prospective suffering of the people will cause them to ask: Who got us into this, and why? If the revulsion is sharp enough, the fact of maladjustment to the conditions of life in the world will be sufficiently evident in the national loss

and pain. In such case there will be no desire to return to the gods that have led into nothing but desperate calamity. The first accounting in such a case is not with the mores, but with the false leaders; and with the autocracy and militarism will go, unless the Germans are malevolent by nature, in the very germ-plasm, that obsession and insulation which have drugged sensitiveness to environment and thus prevented adjustment along modern lines.

The process of selection, to be effective, is bound to be painful. It is an operation where, if there is faltering at the end, there might as well have been no cutting at all. To this point I shall return. But it is to be recalled that Germany is in the position, among nations, of a criminal outlaw among his fellow-men. It helps the wrong-doer to get on the right track if he is obliged to repair the damage he has done. The thief cannot be allowed, even in his own interest, to keep his plunder subsequent to his conversion. When the Allied spokesman demanded reparation, restitution, and guarantees, he was calling for precisely those things which are best for Germany, as well as due her victims. Insistence upon these demands is indispensable. Much there is that Germany must pay for, in years to come — through the contempt and dislike of the

world — for they cannot be atoned for in terms of material things, and no one who is civilized wants to see retaliation in kind. But what she can repair and restore she should be held to repair and restore to the last item.

I have said that nothing but a military victory will do. That is because I can see no other way to upset the fetish, strip off the insulation, and thus expose the German mores to the necessity of adjustment. The *sine qua non* is the fall of the fetish. If that can be accomplished in some other way that shall be decisive and definitive, well and good. Nevertheless whatever the nature of the last push that displaces the tottering structure, military force will have been an indispensable factor; and any alternative way can scarcely be less terrible.

XVI. ON FALTERING AT THE FINISH

When the war began there were not a few of us who saw the issue as a local thing. Desperate efforts were being made to localize it. Only later did it appear that the very essence of civilization was challenged, and that the warnings of Washington about European entanglements were irrelevant to an issue that transcended any continent or hemisphere. Some saw this after the rush through Belgium, others after the Lusitania episode; but it was over two years before public opinion, in this relatively remote land, had sensed the danger sufficiently to support armed intervention.

Similarly slow has been the comprehension of the strength and system of preparedness of the enemy. It was incredible that he would do what he did in the line of atrocities; and it was also incredible that he had been working out his code and preparing so long and so successfully. Even now, with not a little bitter experience behind us, we are from day to day amazed and shocked at the exhibitions of unscrupulous efficiency that are

being revealed to us. It is easy enough to blame some one else, especially some one in power whom we do not like, for not appreciating the whole situation beforehand; but it is graceless to charge any ruler of a civilized nation with sloth or cowardice because his mind was not attuned to take in the bearings of what he had to be brought by hard experience to believe at all. If there had been another Kaiser at Washington, very likely he would have had a mind attuned to the situation as an American's was not. There is real ground for self-respect in the fact that we were not able readily to conceive of the inconceivably base. No one but the bitter partisan can jibe at the remark attributed to the Secretary of War: "I delight in the fact that when we entered this war we were not, like our adversary, ready for it, anxious for it, prepared for it, and inviting it. Accustomed to peace, we were not ready." "The overwhelming majority of American people," comments Professor Sherman,[1] "will perfectly understand that utterance and sympathize with it. In exactly the same sense the English people, in the midst of a tremendous emergency, have very generally pointed, with a kind of tragic

[1] "Why Mr. Roosevelt and the Rest of Us Are at War," in the New York *Nation* for November 15, 1917.

pride and joy, to the fact that they were *not prepared*, as the irrefutable evidence of their pacific intentions and as the substantial vindication of their honor in the community of nations."

This military unpreparedness, however, though we may rightly be proud of it and of the spirit behind it, has represented for us the same sort of handicap that an unarmed and peaceful citizen labors under when he is suddenly obliged to encounter a desperado with a blackjack. We are finding that out. German efficiency has never been as great or as thorough as in the present struggle; that is no wonder, for it has put its best for decades into preparation against "The Day." At first it looked like an unequal contest, with such a preponderance of nations and numbers on the Allied side; but that the inequality lay in the other direction speedily became apparent. It will never cease to amaze most of us that the Germans did not at once take Paris; we are almost ready to credit the tale that it was their gluttony and thirst for French champagne that defeated them. And much of the initial advantage still remains — above all the centralization of control. The Allies have admittedly made error after error, where the enemy has made but few. This is natural enough, for, as we now know, the Allies were to the Ger-

mans as a novice in an odious trade to an enthusiastic devotee of the same.

Except for the British navy. For the German naval programs and performances had been observed by the Admiralty, viewed with concern, protested against, and at length met with counter-preparation. Here the German menace had been taken seriously and the defenses strengthened. But it was defense only that was contemplated; as a matter of fact, the British navy has come to be one of the most powerful factors making for peace and freedom that the world has known, and it has been, in this war, the very bulwark of civilization. Germany points at British navalism as identical with the militarism charged to her; but the character of the one differs from that of the other by reason of the spirit in which the arm of power is used or designed to be used. There is no fetish about British navalism, if it is pleasing to call it that. There is really no –ism or doctrine. The doctrine behind German militarism is now clearly enough revealed; but there is as little of that sort of dogma in British navalism as behind our new American militancy. Either may lead to an –ism if the nation in question becomes sufficiently obsessed and retrogressive; but there is as yet no British or American tendency toward

beating with the heated and unbalanced head in the dust before the fetish-stool.

The initial lack of preparedness is being rapidly overcome. Says one of the Cabinet officers: "A democracy making war is never an agreeable sight, for it is not in its normal line of life. And those who sneer or jeer because it does not play the game as well as might be, pay an unconscious compliment to the merits of free institutions. It takes time to accustom men to the short, hard words of command, and to the surrender of personal judgment. It is not easy, either, for a nation to turn its back upon the conception of a world where justice works out its ends by quiet processes, and in its stead come to the stern belief that the ultimate court is a battlefield. So, if there is wrenching and side-slipping and confusion, there should be no surprise. The surprise to me has been with what comparative ease the transition has been made, and how much unconscious preparation for the new work had been already made." It is remarkable that democracies where freedom of opinion makes for diffusion, have adjusted themselves so rapidly and effectively to unexpected and poorly understood conditions. It simply goes to show the adaptability of a public opinion unused to direction and repression. A nation which has

faced for generations toward production and peace must now aim at destruction and war. It is no slight task to swing the massive engine about. It takes time to beat the plow-share into a sword and to make of a professional producer an expert destroyer. But there is another thing that is still harder to do, and that is to steel the hearts of humane men of peace against premature pity and softening; to have them hold relentlessly to the noisome task until it is done for good and all; to have no faltering before or at the finish.

Our adversaries have no such prospect to cause them concern; no hearts need to be steeled against human pity. We are, again, plainly at a material disadvantage. It is we, not the adversary, who have lost precious lives by humanity and chivalry. Our foes do not mind crying "Kamerad!" and then opening ranks for the hidden machine-guns to play upon the unsuspecting. It is they who will try, in straits, to net us by plausible duplicity, to our destruction. We do not want to practice any of these things; we are too proud to fight in that way; but we must not be taken in any more by reason of our humane impulses.

Particularly do we Americans run the risk of

insisting foolishly and ignorantly upon stopping the conflict before selection is accomplished. Not a few of us seem to be impressed by the Russian formula of "No annexations and no indemnities." It is a fair guess that that formula originated in a German head. What is happening in Russia as the result of fantastic and utopian procedures ought to give even a sentimentalist pause. The trouble, as I have said, is the incapacity of many people for visualization of actualities not right at hand. Such persons are bleared as to the mind's eye. All right-minded men want the war to stop; but they want it to stay stopped. The only important question is as to how soon it can stop, on condition that it shall satisfy justice, perform its selection, and so stop for good. How soon can "Never Again!" in the matter of this great issue, be transformed from a fervent purpose into an assured reality?

Now, what some of us fear, in connection with this "no-indemnities" suggestion, is that certain sentimentalists, by raising a rhythmic clamor that shall beat intolerably upon the ears of a tired world, will succeed in staying the hand of justice in the matter of restitution, reparation, and guarantees; and thus operate to prevent the cleaning-up of this whole job in workmanlike

style.[1] Presumably such a movement will not originate in Belgium, or France, or, indeed, among any other of the victims of Germany's barbarities; nor yet among those who have been near enough to see and know, and to experience righteous indignation. It will be among the ethical theorists whose phantasms have not been tested by reference to fact, and who can voice a lofty magnanimity from a protected station.

Of all the Allies, we Americans are farthest removed from a realization of what the Germans have planned and done. Even the French have felt that they must keep an account of the details of German ferocity against the day of settlement. Over here we do not know even by hearsay — least of all have we yet experienced — the barbarities which the French are afraid they may forget, as the weariness grows more mortal and the sensibilities are dulled through the long months of trials and efforts. But now we shall have a weighty voice in the settlement of things. And if the end should come before we experience the losses and the heart-ache, we shall be too likely to minimize the wantonnesses committed against

[1] The rest of this chapter is derived, with insignificant alteration, from a letter of the author, entitled "On Faltering at the Finish," in the New York *Nation* for June 7, 1917.

others, and shall perhaps wish to conclude the task without bringing it to a finish. Some of us will harp on the familiar sentiment that the criminal is not responsible, that punishment should not be vindictive, that severity never acts as a deterrent; others will appeal to the chivalry that will not strike the opponent when he is down. A number of people will want to be content with the treatment of symptoms, and to neglect the extirpation of the lurking disease. Other scruples will appear which do more credit to the heart than to the head. And then, if the evil is not resolutely cut out, it will resume its growth and the suffering and loss will have to be incurred again, in more disastrous form, later on.

The distinction between hostility to the German government and that toward the German people will again be drawn. It is risky to make a distinction of this kind. The issue is not, at bottom, hostility to any persons; it is reprobation of what the persons stand for. But there is no doubt, as we have said, that the German people, Socialists and all, have stood for what the German government and armies have done. They have been deceived, no doubt; but the responsibility for that cannot rest elsewhere than on themselves. They have been dominated by a fetish; but they

bent gladly in their adulation. If they were merely in error, yet it is the way of the world that people must suffer for their own errors. It is thus that they learn to correct themselves — not by being instructed and excused, over and over, but by bitter experience. It is not just that those who were not dominated by illusion, or had worked themselves out of it, should pay for the damage resulting from the ecstasy and intoxication of the obsessed. The German people have stood for the destruction and rape that have been perpetrated upon other people's homes and women; it is right that they should expiate all this in the small and insufficient degree possible. Much is irreparable; reparation for the reparable should be sternly exacted. Only thus can the illusion and obsession be dispelled. The way to see one's actions as they are is to be held accountable for their results; and many a man changes his ways when he is once forced to visualize them as others see them. There are no fruits more meet for repentance than those tendered, voluntarily or not, in restitution and reparation.

There has got to be a real right-about here. Life would not be livable for most of humanity if the German ideas and power should prevail. The fact that most of humanity now sees the peril

and is in arms against the dominance of that for which Germany stands is eloquent witness to this contention. Here is the revelation of a startling danger to the world. It is like the discovery of an unsuspected malignant tumor in the body. Now that we have had to go in with the knife and have uncovered an insidiousness of menace that is simply incredible, the operation should not be stayed by false humanitarianism until the roots of the disorder are removed. This is not vindictiveness or inhumanity; it is, on the contrary, common sense and an exhibition of the highest humanity. The wholesome development of human society is unthinkable with this menace always in its vitals. And as for hitting an enemy when down, who would apply that rule of chivalry to a serpent? It is not the men that are the target for the blows, I repeat — it is the thing the men stand for; only, as long as they stand for the venomous and detestable thing and hug it to them, they should expect to stop the blows that are levelled at it.

The victory is not here, but it is only delayed. However long the delay, it is not too early to consider the terms of settlement. Whatever these are to be, this country has no business to introduce palliation for the culprit where it has not

done the suffering. If any of the belligerents who has borne the burden and pain of oppression and humiliation wants to ease up on the defeated aggressor — if Belgium or France, for example, wishes so to do — that is in order. But for us, who for many months have reposed in a safety bought by others' sacrifices, to introduce any element of condonement is worse than impertinent. Our attitude should be an humble one until we have suffered something of what the rest have suffered and attained something of the dignity that goes with it. The Allies are not revengeful barbarians; they will be magnanimous enough without us to teach them. They have met the peril face to face, and they agree that they want restitution, reparation, and guarantees. Entering fresh, as we do, later in the struggle, we might easily, when it comes to a settlement, introduce an element of easygoing and careless generosity which would amount to faltering at the finish. Our part is to realize the seriousness of this situation, drop all dallying with preconceptions and soft imaginings, and see it through to a genuine finish.

XVII. ON INTELLIGENT ADJUSTMENT TO THE INEVITABLE

This gigantic world-convulsion is not the end of all things. It may seem so to the simple-minded individual whose horizon is bounded by his suffering. Similar periods in the world's history have led to despairing prophecies of the world's end or of the advent of some supernatural power, as alone competent to bring order out of bewilderment and confusion. This is only the end of some things and the beginning of others. If the great issue is decided now, we shall enter, not upon a new and strange societal order, but upon one which has shaken off enormous impediments and may now attain, unhampered, to closer adjustment to life-conditions along the lines of its vindicated code. If, on the contrary, the decision is lost by us, or drawn, or not completed to its finish, we shall go on to the next stage of a protracted period of conflict and selection, with all its attendant misery. If the civilized world cannot now rise in its might, it will

have to do so, later on, amidst throes of human pain to which the present ones are as preliminary twinges. But the selection will take place—then, if not now.

This war is not an unique affair, except in the matter of scale. It is discharging war's normal function, just as it did when Roman fought Carthaginian or when Napoleon's armies swept over Europe. Every such war uprooted some codes and societal structures and made room for the persistence and growth of others. Now, in the perspective of history, reason generally applauds the results. In any case they are what has enabled the modern world to become what it is. These results are also in sequence, exhibiting a trend from a code we call savage, through the barbaric, to the civilized. Occasional retrograde movements are to be found, but they are presently made up for. Judging by the past, it is unbelievable that civilization can go back on its course and stay there. This is the broad reason for inferring that the cause of the Allies, backed by the approval of most of what used to be called the civilized world, cannot permanently fail. It cannot, because the code it defends is one long ago proved to be a better adaptation to the life-conditions of societies than a code in-

cluding the elements which characterize the present challenging code.

The extension of the peace-group is a scarcely interrupted evolutionary process, and there is no discoverable reason why it should not be further extended, this present vicious challenge once repelled. The code of this peace-group, in so far as the latter had taken form previous to the challenge, has shown no change in its essentials as it has expanded over a wider and wider clientage. Its democracy is in the air and has been automatically enlarging its sphere of influence, decade by decade, until the challenge came. War, on the contrary, with militarism and autocracy, has been on the steady decline for a long time, and even the warlike, militaristic, and autocratic peoples have nominally repudiated it. This war is really between peoples who say they are peace-loving, industrial, and democratic, and are, and peoples who say they are all these things, and are not. Both sides lay claim to the more expedient code of peace, and thereby vindicate its prospects of extension; both sides claim to abhor the code of violence and thereby point to its eventual decline, if not elimination. In view of such considerations, I cannot see a lasting victory for any other code of international con-

duct than the one now challenged. With such convictions, it is impossible to be permanently depressed over the incidents of the selective process.

It matters, of course, that the Bolsheviki are writing themselves down in the Shakespearean fashion; but it does not matter vitally. It matters when you are among the trees but not when you view the woods. This whole situation is quite out of the hands of individuals like Lenine, or Hindenburg, or the Kaiser. Individuals matter some, but not much, or vitally, or in the long run. We see the chips, but it is the tide that counts. This human fragment is borne prominently upon a tide of rebellion; the tide rushes on to dominance and he is the founder of a new nation or dispensation; the tide is checked and turned back, and he is a traitor of inglorious memory; the tide sweeps forward again, with renewed power, and he is a martyr, born before his time.

Societal evolution is a vast process, where the forces are massive and act with unhurried deliberation, endlessly interlocking, within a spacious field. "Ein wechselnd Weben, Ein glühend Leben." There are dim ages of the process behind us, and ages untold yet to come. Selection

occurs at every stage, and is but an episode along the course.

How then can men do anything, if all is determined by such cosmic power? Why struggle? Well, man can do something with gravitation, with the expansive power of steam, with the germ-plasm stream, although he can control the processes themselves in no degree. He can move things about, into the path, or out of the path of natural forces. He can place the mill-wheel beneath the falling water. He can place the cylinder in the way of the steam. He can isolate or bring together the sexes of animals. This has been done so successfully for man's interest and welfare that man has conceived the idea that he is master of nature. But what he has done is to learn nature's ways and adapt his action to them. At a pinch he is nature's plaything and victim: the earth shakes a little, and his great works collapse; the volcano spills a little gas over its crater-rim upon a town, and the lords of nature lay them down and are still.

It is not otherwise with the elemental forces of the societal realm. They cannot be mastered; they must be studied and known and adjusted to, as a condition of societal well-being. The efforts of many a would-be benefactor and up-

lifter of the race are sterile or even harmful because he is trying to do what he would realize, if he knew what a society is, and what can and cannot be done with it, to be out of the question. Every one knows that water will not run uphill; yet in the societal realm there have been plenty of well-meaning people, through the ages, who have worn out and wasted their lives in unhappiness, trying ineffectually to overcome a societal tendency and law which are equally inevitable. If an ignoramus plays about in a chemical laboratory, we keep our distance, for we expect trouble as a result of ignorance of chemical substances and laws. Knowledge of the experimenter's good intentions does not reassure us at all. But we easily permit the uninformed to prowl about the structure of society, poking and tinkering, apparently in the belief that, provided his intentions are good, nothing but human weal can result. We are bound to learn, sometime, that powerful forces are at work within the societal range, and that ignorant tampering is even more dangerous here than elsewhere because so many more people have to endure the consequences. Then we shall want more knowledge of these forces, that we may adjust to them.

The present is a sort of orgy of dislocation and

of alteration in the conditions of society's life. In the early pages of this little book I have cited a selection of unplanned and unforeseen adjustments that are already in the process of painful birth. And I have gone on to show some of the exhibitions of the societal forces, in this their period and phase of inexorable stress and strain. Many of the barriers which we have raised between ourselves and the raw and remorseless violence of primordial power have now broken down and must be painfully built up again. It is a time for knowledge and for the broadest outlook. It is a time for perspective of the past, that we may not become involved in vain hopes or uncalled-for despairs. It is a time when we must understand the forces determining the evolution and life of human society as well as possible, that we may move things into and out of their path with the idea of utilizing their power in the interest of human well-being.

Intelligent adjustment to the known inevitable is as rare on earth as automatic adjustment to the unknown inevitable is common. But the former is an abridged and less painful process. Adaptation is sure, because it is the condition of comfort and of life itself. Adaptability is that which hurries and eases the process. Of all earthly

things that which possesses the supreme capacity for swift adaptation is the human mind. But that capacity is undeveloped, fettered in its action by pseudo-knowledge, bias, caprice, and sentimentality — except where tests and verification are immediate and conclusive, and where, therefore, knowledge is almost automatically acquired. Nowhere is real knowledge and science so little in intelligent demand as in the societal realm, for the latter is self-sown to whims and dreams of all varieties. It is thought that man can here have his own will; here, at last and at least, he is lord. He senses no elemental powers in the field. Here, of all places, he needs but to plan and "create"; pass resolutions and regulations; think out utopias in bed and then rise and gird himself to their realization; abolish property or the family, or government, or religion. Naturally he is taken by the theory that societal evolution is by individual purposeful action. Naturally he regards insistence upon the control exerted by spontaneous, automatic, and impersonal forces as an assault upon his "free will."

Sometimes, in a crisis, the verities stand forth and enforce to themselves an attention which they do not get in ordinary times. Many people are now perplexed and in weak despair because

their comfortable little formulas crack and break under the weight of explanation laid upon them. Perhaps it is a favorable occasion to offer the contention that "social theory" is not wholly academic after all.

But the thesis of this little book is not thus general. I have aimed at an entirely practical application of evolutionary theory to a particular episode in the evolution of human society. For those whose convictions run with mine, a quite definite line of action is indicated. It is possible enough to arrive at the same convictions without going through a course of reasoning in self-justification; but, as I said at the outset, no faith was ever weakened by the support of reason.

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